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Entrapment is as old as a pleasant garden, a forbidden fruit, and a
subtle snake. "The serpent beguiled me, and I did eat," pleaded Eve in
response to an accusing Lord God.' Early English cases report instances of
citizens being lured into crime so they might be apprehended. 2 Nineteenth
century American cases similarly record examples of persons tempted to
illegality for the purpose of subjecting them to criminal sanctions .
Entrapment as a social phenomenon has long been with us.
.Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. A.B., Harvard
University; J.D., Columbia University School of Law; LL.M., Columbia University School
of Law. I thank Anthony Duff, Stuart Green, and Peter Henning, whose insightful comments
and critiques should in no way be construed as endorsements.
'Genesis 3:13 (King James). The theme of entrapment is explicit in Milton's
chronicling of the fall of man. Milton describes the plans of the envious fallen angels to
bring Man into God's disfavor by tempting him to transgress. See JOHN MILTON, PARADISE
LOST, bk. 2, II. 361-69 (1667).
2 See Rex v. Bickley, 2 Crim. App. R. 53, 73 J.P. 239 (C.C.A. 1909) (undercover police
officer convinces chemist to sell aborticide); Regina v. Titley, 14 Cox Crim. Cas. 502 (Cent.
Crim. Ct. 1880) (same); Rex v. Holden, 127 Eng. Rep. 1107 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1810) (bank
agents solicit defendants to purchase forged notes).
3 See People v. Mills, 70 N.E. 786 (N.Y. 1904) (undercover police officer provides
indictments for defendant to steal); Bd. of Commr's v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1864) (defendant sells liquor without a license to police agents and then is sued for
penalty); President of the Town of St. Charles v. O'Mailey, 18 III 407 (1857) (same).
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In contrast, entrapment as a legal defense is of relatively recent mint.
Under the defense, a person may not be convicted of a crime if he has been
encouraged to commit it by a government agent under the appropriate
circumstances. The doctrine's genesis is generally traced to a series of
United States Supreme Court opinions starting in the 1930s. 4  These
opinions broke with the traditional view that it was legally irrelevant how
the criminal was led to temptationi Following the Supreme Court's lead,
virtually every jurisdiction in the United States has adopted a version of the
defense.6 Based on its brief history and wide reception, entrapment has
strong claim to being the newest inductee into the criminal law's pantheon
of defenses.7
The fact that entrapment was for so long unrecognized as grounds for
exoneration suggests that its rationale is not obvious. Indeed, a moment's
4 See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.
369 (1958); Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). Cf Casey v. United States, 276
U.S. 413, 421-25 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) (willing to recognize defense). These
cases, of course, were not without harbingers. In the 1920s, lower courts had occasionally
grasped and applied the underlying principles of entrapment as a defense. See Rebecca
Roiphe, The Serpent Beguiled Me: A History of the Entrapment Defense, 33 SETON HALL L.
REV. 257, 278-85 (2003); see also Michael A. DeFeo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal
Responsibility: Its History, Theory and Application, I U.S.F. L. REV. 243, 248 (1967)
(identifying Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218 (1878), as earlier United States entrapment
case). Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court, in the decisions cited above, stamped
it with an unassailable seal of approval and put the defense on the national map.
5 See Roiphe, supra note 4, at 271 ("No state or federal court recognized entrapment as a
valid defense prior to 1870."); WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, 450 (3d. ed. 2000) ("[A]s a
historical matter, the traditional response of the law was that there were no limits upon the
degree of temptation to which law enforcement officers and their agents could subject those
under investigation."). To this day, the defense of entrapment is generally not recognized in
England. See PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 2 (2d ed. 1995).
6 See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.13 cmt. at 407 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1985) ("[Tjhe defense of entrapment has been almost universally
recognized in the United States."). Twenty-five states have adopted entrapment statutes.
See MARCUS, supra note 5, ch. 12 (listing statutes). The remaining states and the federal
system have judicially-created entrapment defenses.
7 Though widely discussed, the battered woman syndrome defense is not well-
established. While expert testimony concerning the psychological aspects of abusive
relationships is usually admissible, see Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d I (Okla. Crim. App.
1992) (collecting cases from other jurisdictions), it is not clear that battered woman
syndrome is properly described as a "new" defense. Some suggest it is best conceived of as
a subcategory of self-defense, see Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and
Duress: Making Sense, Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REv. 207
(2002), and others suggest it is best conceived of as a subcategory of duress. See Laurie
Kratky Dore, Downward Adjustment and the Slippery Slope: The Use of Duress in the
Defense of Battered Offenders, 56 OHmO ST. L.J. 665 (1995).
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consideration reveals the defense to be positively perplexing. Consider
these scenarios:
Jacob is a 56-year-old farmer. He orders by mail a magazine of photographs of
nude boys at a time when such materials could by legally ordered. Subsequently,
over a two-and-a-half year period, he receives unsolicited mailing from five
organizations such as "The American Hedonist Society, " which purport to oppose
censorship of pornography and support sexual freedom. Although Jacob does not
place an order for child pornography with one such organization that contacts him
through the mail, through a second he orders a magazine entitled "Boys Who Love
Boys. " Jacob is subsequently arrested for possessing sexually explicit depictions
of children.
Ken is desperately in need of money. He approaches Rocky for a loan. Rocky
refuses, but convinces Ken, who has no history of drug use, to join a drug
transaction. Ken and Rocky drive to a highway intersection where they meet
Willy. Willy gives Ken $300. Willy and Ken agree to meet later that day to
complete the transaction. Ken reluctantly accepts a bag containing three grams of
cocaine from Rocky. Rocky, Ken and Willy later meet in a parking lot. When Ken
gives Willy the bag, he is arrested and charged with dealing in cocaine.
Rich runs an ongoing yard sale. One day at the yard sale, he is approached by
Dale. Dale offers him $200 worth offood stamps for an electric typewriter. When
Rich declines, Dale asks him if he would be interested in purchasing the food
stamps. Rich, who enjoys bartering, offers Dale $30, and they shortly agree on
$35. Next month, Rich is again approached by Dale, and Rich agrees to buy $870
worth of food stamps for $140. Rich is charged with unauthorized use of food
stamps.
On these facts, Jacob, Ken and Rich will almost certainly be guilty as
charged and face significant periods of incarceration. Indeed, their cases
might be considered all too common examples of how persons come to step
over the line into illegality and become first-time offenders. Now,
however, add the facts that (1) the organizations that contacted Jacob were
fictitious ones created by a unit within the Postal Service; (2) Rocky is an
informant and Willy is an undercover police officer, and (3) Dale is an
undercover police officer. With these additional facts, Jacob, Ken, and
Rich will very likely be able to establish the entrapment defense and avoid
all liability.8
Why should Jacob, Ken and Rich now escape criminal sanctions? As
a doctrinal matter, the government's role in the crimes is the critical
element triggering the operation of the defense. In order for a defendant to
8 The three entrapment scenarios presented above are based on Jacobson v. United
States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992), Kats v. Indiana, 559 N.E.2d 348 (Ind. Ct. Apps. 1990), and
People v. Boalbey, 493 N.E.2d 369 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986), respectively. In all three cases,
entrapment was found to be established as a matter of law. Entrapment as a matter of law is
a very demanding standard, appropriate only where the existence of entrapment is
indisputable. The scenarios above, consequently, represent clear cases of entrapment.
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ANTHONY M. DILLOF
establish the entrapment defense, a government agent must be the tempter
or inducer.9 This fact, however, appears to have no bearing on the personal
blameworthiness of Jacob, Ken and Rich. After all, as far as they knew,
they were dealing with private citizens. Subjectively they appear to share
the same culpable states of mind as their hypothetical counterparts who
correctly believed they were dealing with private citizens and who would be
convicted. In both the actual and hypothetical cases, the temptations should
have been resisted. Likewise, it appears that Jacob, Ken and Rich are no
less dangerous to society by virtue of the government's role in their crimes.
Their dispositions to crime are equally well confirmed regardless of
whether those they are interacting with are employed by the government or
are private citizens. Punishment is generally considered appropriate for
those who have manifested their dangerousness through blameworthy
conduct prohibited by the criminal law. Punishment therefore seems
appropriate for Jacob, Ken and Rich. To be sure, some police activities that
target the blameworthy and dangerous persons are objectionable on public
policy grounds. For example, unconstitutional searches and seizures,'0 even
if in principle unobjectionable when used against criminals," are never
permitted because they carry an unacceptable risk of being used against
innocent citizens who can rightly object to them. However, it is unclear
what risks are posed to innocent citizens by the type of actions employed
against Jacob, Ken and Rich as innocent citizens do not act in morally
culpable ways. Why then permit the plea of entrapment?
Entrapment has been described as a defense "buffeted by conflicting
interpretations. 12  This Article attempts to advance a new and superior
interpretation by focusing on the relevancy of the entrapper's governmental
status. In this manner, the puzzle of entrapment can be neatly unraveled.
First, the article presents the basic contours of the doctrine. Second, it
reviews a variety of theories of entrapment and exposes their shortcomings
as explanations for why the entrapped should be exonerated. Third, the
Article introduces and defends a new theory of entrapment-entrapment as
unfairness. According to this theory, entrapment is neither an excuse, a
9 See MARCUS, supra note 5, §§ 4.02, 5.10. A more detailed statement of the
requirements of the entrapment defense is presented in Part 11, infra.
10 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11 Persons, it might be argued, as a matter of morality forfeit rights to privacy and liberty
upon engaging in culpable illegal conduct. This fact appears dimly recognized in the
constitutional doctrine that a person has no legitimate privacy interest in the nondisclosure of
illegal activity. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122-24 (1984) (holding use of
field test to identify substance as cocaine not a search).
12 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 542 (1978).
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justification, nor a public policy defense, as those categories have
traditionally been understood. Rather, entrapment is fatally unfair to its
target in the following sense: For society to impose criminal sanctions on
an entrapped person would be to place on her a disproportionate share of
the cost of general crime prevention and control, violating the well-
established norm of distributive justice that, to the extent possible, the cost
of an activity should be shared among all its beneficiaries. After
elaborating this thesis, the Article considers and responds to a number of
potential objections to entrapment as unfairness. Finally, the Article applies
the theory to a number of current controversies concerning entrapment.
II. THE LAW OF ENTRAPMENT
Any exposition of the law of entrapment must begin with the fact that
the doctrine has two versions. The first version is the subjective version;
the second is the objective version. As discussed below, although they are
distinct in structure and content, they overlap significantly in application.
A. BASICS OF THE SUBJECTIVE VERSION
The subjective version of the entrapment defense is followed in the
federal courts and in a substantial majority of the states. 13 Commonly it is
judicially created and lacks a statutory formulation.' 4
The subjective version of the defense has a two-part structure. In most
courts employing the subjective version, a defendant wishing to assert
entrapment must first establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a
government agent "induced" him to commit the crime he is charged with.'
If he is unsuccessful, the defense fails. If the defendant is successful in
carrying this burden of proof, the burden shifts to the government to prove
13 In Jacobson v. United States, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to the
subjective approach. 503 U.S. 540, 548-49 (1992). Most states have adopted the subjective
approach. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 6, § 409 n.9 (providing
examples). Only about a dozen states have opted for the alternative objective approach. See
infra note 41.
14 Federal courts, lacking the power to create either substantive criminal laws or
defenses, have determined that, in enacting various criminal offense statutes, Congress
intended that those entrapped not be convicted. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,
446-48 (1932). As Park notes, whatever the plausibility of this determination with respect to
early statutes used to prosecute the entrapped, "there is nothing extraordinary in assuming
that Congress intends its [latter] enactments to be subject to the entrapment defense, just as
they are subject to other common law defenses (such as insanity and duress)." Roger Park,
The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 247 (1976).




beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was "predisposed" to commit
the crime. 16 If the government carries its burden of proof demonstrating
predisposition, the defense fails. However, if at this point the government
fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the induced defendant was
predisposed, the defense succeeds and the defendant is acquitted on the
ground of entrapment.
In practice, it is relatively easy for the defendant to satisfy the first part
of the test. "Inducement" has been defined expansively as "soliciting,
proposing, initiating, broaching or suggesting the commission of the offense
charged."' 7  It is clear that inducement requires more than merely the
furnishing of an opportunity for crime. 8 An offer to purchase drugs at
market price, for example, is not an inducement. 9  Nevertheless,
inducement does not require that the government agent's conduct caused
the defendant to commit the crime. It will suffice that the conduct "could
have caused an indisposed person to commit the crime. ° Significantly,
there is no formal requirement that the inducement offered by the
government rise to a particular level of force, persuasiveness or pressure.2
For example, entrapment has been found as a matter of law where a 1930s
prohibition agent, after establishing that he and the defendant had served in
the same army division, merely made repeated requests for illegal liquor to
the defendant. 2 Likewise, entrapment has been found as a matter of law
based merely on repeated requests for narcotics- by an acquaintance
claiming to need them to assuage his addiction.23 Rather than focusing on
the conduct of the tempter, the requirement of inducement in practice seems
to focus on the status of the tempter.24 Only government inducement will
16 See id. § 6.07.
17 United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 883 (2d Cir. 1952) (Hand, J.). Accord United
States v. Dunn, 779 F.2d 157, 158 (2d Cir. 1985).
18 See United States v. Bibbey, 735 F.2d 619, 621-22 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v.
Randolph, 738 F.2d 244 (8th Cir. 1984); State v. Kotwitz, 549 So.2d 351, 357 (La. Ct. App.
1989).
'9 See, e.g., Ruggs v. State, 601 So.2d 508, 511 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).
20 United States v. Kelly, 748 F.2d 691, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
21 United States v. Licursi, 525 F.2d 1164, 1168 (2d Cir. 1975) (inducement involves
only "'the Government's initiation of the crime and not ... the degree of pressure exerted"')
(citing United States v. Riley, 363 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir. 1966)).
22 See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 439-40 (1932).
23 See Sherman v. United States, 365 U.S. 369, 370-71 (1958).
24 See United States v. Borum, 584 F.2d 424, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("While
predisposition is the key issue, it does not totally subsume the question of inducement, for
separate consideration of the inducement issue illuminates one critical, additional element of
the entrapment defense: instigation of the criminal act by government agents.").
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qualify a defendant for entrapment.2 s Where the government has played no
significant role, the question of a predisposition does not arise. The
requirement of inducement acts as a gate-keeping measure for the real ball
game in the subjective version of the entrapment defense: the question of a
predisposition.
Whether a person is predisposed is based on the person's disposition
prior to his first contact with government agents.26 The question is whether,
at that point, he was "ready and willing" to commit the crime "whenever the
opportunity was afforded., 27 Such a query is unusual. Traditionally, the
criminal law has shied away from the direct inquiry whether a person is
predisposed to criminality. It has been thought that findings of a criminal
predisposition, that is, propensity for crime before any crime has been
attempted, could not be made with sufficient reliability to warrant the
imprisonment of those so identified.28 Dangerous people, of course, must
be identified and incapacitated. Yet rather than predicating liability on a
predisposition alone, the criminal law has favored the establishment of
inchoate offenses, such as attempt and conspiracy. Liability for these
offenses requires a finding of criminal intent.29 Intent implies a conscious
state of mind,3° rather than merely a disposition, which is simply a tendency
or potential to respond to a stimulus should that stimulus arise.
Furthermore, inchoate offenses generally include an "overt act" requirement
to supplement and bolster the finding of criminal intent.3 1 Entrapment thus
presents a stark exception to the general reluctance to inquire directly about
criminal propensity.
The existence of a predisposition is in most cases a question of fact for
the jury. In reviewing jury findings of a predisposition, courts have
identified a number of factors relevant to whether a predisposition to the
offense charge existed: (1) the character or reputation of the defendant,
25 See MARCUS, supra note 5, § 8.03 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Manzella, 791
F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir. 1986) ("There is no defense of private entrapment.")).
26 See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549 (1992), (holding that predisposition
must exist not only prior to inducement, but prior to government contact).
27 id.
28 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT 32 (Apr. 11, 2003) ("Much research on
selective incapacitation has been performed since 1962, and the brunt of the findings is that
it is difficult to predict future serious criminal behavior with acceptable levels of accuracy.").
29 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.01(1), 5.03(1) & (b); LAFAVE, supra note 5, §§ 11.3,
12.2(3).
30 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) & (b); LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 5.2.
31 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.01(2) (requiring act that strongly corroborates actor's
criminal intent), 5.03(5) (requiring overt act for conspiracy unless conspiracy to engage in
felony of first or second degree); LAFAVE, supra note 5, §§ 11.4, 12.2.
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ANTHONYM. DILLOF
including any prior criminal record; (2) whether the government initially
suggested the criminal activity; (3) whether the defendant engaged in the
crime for profit; (4) the nature of the government inducement; and, most
importantly, (5) whether the defendant expressed reluctance to commit the
crime which had to be overcome through repeated government
inducement.32
Although theoretically distinct, inquiries into the existence of
inducement and predisposition in practice often overlap. Factors (2), (4)
and (5) relate directly to possible actions of the government in encouraging
the crime. This overlap should be no surprise. The entrapment defense is
commonly raised in circumstances where the defendant has indisputably
committed a criminal act.33 This act itself implies the existence of a
predisposition since in the great majority of cases, those who commit
criminal acts were disposed to do so. The government in effect relies on an
overt act after the inducement to demonstrate predisposition at the time of
the inducement.34 The strength of such an inference naturally varies
inversely with the strength of the inducement. The weaker the inducement,
the greater the need to posit a predisposition to crime to explain the
defendant's act, and so the stronger the inference to predisposition.35
Therefore, while there is no formal requirement that the inducement be
particularly powerful in order to establish the defense, only where it is
strong will the defendant be able to avoid the inference of predisposition,
defeating his entrapment claim.
Other issues concerning the scope of the defense have not been clearly
resolved. For example, should a defendant be entitled to the defense in
cases where he desired to commit the offense charged, but where, but for
the government's involvement, it is clear that he would not have? For
example, D wants to counterfeit money, but is completely without the
resources to do so before government agents supply D with the necessary
32 United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 1986).
33 In order to raise the entrapment defense, a defendant need not concede prima facie
liability. Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 64-66 (1988). Nevertheless, because of the
government's first-hand involvement in the events leading to the arrest, the evidence that the
defendant engaged in prohibited conduct is usually strong and often uncontested.
34 See Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370, 373 (1st Cir. 1967); Harrison v. State, 442
A.2d 1377, 1379-80 (Del. 1982) (explaining the relevancy of defendant's response to
inducement to predisposition); Park, supra note 14, at 200.
35 See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 550 (1992) (stating that in typical case,
defense is of little use because "the ready commission of the criminal act amply
demonstrates the defendant's predisposition").
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equipment.36 Likewise, should the defendant be considered predisposed to
a criminal act if he has some identifiable desire to engage in it, but has
deeply embedded character traits that would, but for government action,
have constrained him from engaging in the act?37 Finally, how similar must
be the crime actually committed and the crime intended? For example, if it
is found that the defendant planned to sell one quantity or type of
contraband on a particular occasion to a particular class of person, and was
induced to sell a very/somewhat/slightly different quantity or type of
contraband on another occasion to a person of another class, should he be
entitled to the entrapment defense? 38 Like most criminal law defenses, the
scope of entrapment is not completely settled.
B. BASICS OF THE OBJECTIVE VERSION
The objective version of the defense is simpler in structure than the
subjective version. The sole and central issue is simply whether the
government's conduct created a substantial risk that such an offense would
be committed by "persons other than those who are ready to commit it"'39 or
alternatively, by "normally law-abiding persons. ' 4° These formulations of
the defense, found respectively in the Model Penal Code and the Brown
Draft of a New Federal Criminal Code, have been the basis for entrapment
defenses adopted by decision or statute in about a dozen states.4'
36 See infra text accompanying notes 208-12.
37 This issue is raised in Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 559-60 (suggesting that government's
overcoming a person's tendency to respect the law should not be equated with creating
predisposition).
38 In federal court, the jury is asked whether the crime the defendant was predisposed to
commit was "of the character" actually committed. Park, supra note 14, at 176. Beyond
that, one scholar has commented, the matter is considered "quintessential[1y] [a] jury issue."
Park, supra note 14, at 178.
39 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(l)(b) (1962).
40 STAFF OF NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, 95th
Cong., FINAL REPORT ON PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 702 (197 1).
41 MARCUS, supra note 5, at 169; see, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-209 (2004)
("Entrapment occurs when a... [law enforcement officer] ... induces the commission of an
offense by using persuasion or other means likely to cause normally law-abiding persons to
commit the offense."); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 (2004) ("Entrapment occurs when a law
enforcement officer... induces the commission of an offense.., by methods creating a
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit
it."). In addition, a defense based on outrageous governmental conduct in instigating
criminal activity exists under the Due Process Clause. See MARCUS, supra note 5, at 265-
318. This defense resembles the objective version of entrapment insofar as it can be
established based solely on governmental conduct; the defendant's disposition is irrelevant.
Id. at 291. The primary difference between the two is that in order to establish the Due
Process defense, a much greater degree of control, entanglement, and overreaching must be
2004]
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In contrast to the subjective version of the defense, the defendant's
characteristics, including any predisposition to crime, are irrelevant. The
focus of the inquiry is how the police conduct at issue may affect a member
of the public in the abstract, not the defendant in particular.4 2 Of course, it
is necessary for the defendant to show that the police conduct actually
targeted him or might have caused the conduct.43 For example, there still
would be liability for criminal conduct occurring before the improper police
conduct. 44 Examples of government conduct found to have violated the
objective standard include appealing to a close personal relationship with
the defendant,45 forming a sexual relationship with the defendant," and
47
offering excessive amounts of money.
There is also a significant procedural difference between the two
versions of the defense. Unlike the subjective test, the objective test is
typically a matter for the court, not the jury, to apply, with the defendant
shouldering the burden of proving entrapment by a preponderance of the
evidence. 8
shown. See Kenneth M. Lord, Entrapment and Due Process: Moving Toward a Dual System
of Defenses, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 463, 505 (1998). Because Due Process entrapment
claims are subsumed by the objective version of the entrapment defense, they present no
novel issues, and shall not be discussed specifically by this Article.
42 It may be- argued that even standard objective formulation does not allow for the
acquittal of a defendant who was dead set on committing the offense. The Model Penal
Code, for example, defines "unlawful entrapment" as conduct by which an officer "induces
or encourages another person" to commit the charged offense. MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.13(1). "Induces" suggests a causal relation between the action of the police and the
criminal conduct of the defendant. A person who was going to engage in conduct anyway
might not be said to be induced to it. If inducement was required, a relatively weak
subjective component would be included in the MPC test. "Encourages," the other term
employed, however, does not necessarily imply a causal relation. Encouragement to act may
be given to a person who does not need it because she was going to act anyway. If
encouragement by the police is all that is necessary, the MPC formulation is wholly
objective.
43 See People v. Crawford, 372 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
44 See Anchorage v. Flanagan, 649 P.2d 957, 960 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
45 See, e.g, Dial v. Florida, 799 So. 2d 407, 409-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); People v.
Soper, 226 N.W.2d 691, 692 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Kamrud, 611 P.2d 188, 192
(Mont. 1980); Commonwealth v. Lucci, 662 A.2d 1, 8-9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
46 People v. Wisneski, 292 N.W.2d 196, 199 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
47 See, e.g., Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 230 (Alaska 1969).
48 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(2) (1962); MARCUS, supra note 5, at 85 n.20, 183.
The objective test is essentially a test of the propriety of police conduct. Advocates of the
objective test thus placed it in the hands of the courts on the ground that, while juries
properly judged defendants, only courts should judge the police. See United States v.
Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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A common problem arises in applying the objective version of
entrapment. In order to determine the effect of the government's conduct
on hypothetical persons who are not ready to commit the offense (or on
hypothetical law-abiding citizens), the court must decide what features the
hypothetical person has. For example, where a recovering drug addict
claims she was entrapped, should the court consider the effect of the
government conduct on an ordinary person who is not ready to commit the
crime, or on a recovering drug addict who is not ready to commit the crime?
The choice may make a difference in the outcome of the test. A recovering
drug addict may be likely to respond to certain government encouragement
to possess drugs where a person who was not addicted might not be likely
to when faced with the same conduct.49  In other contexts where the
behavior of a hypothetical person is relevant to determining the defendant's
liability, the Model Penal Code has opted for partial relativization by asking
what an average person "in the actor's situation" would do.50 Such a
formulation would be broad enough to allow, but not require, the jury to
consider the effect of the government's conduct on those who have an
above-average disposition toward crime, such as drug users, even if they are
not ready to commit the offense.
C. RELATION OF THE SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE VERSIONS
At this stage, subjective and objective versions of the entrapment
defense may be usefully compared. On the formal level, both versions have
a critical hypothetical component. Under the subjective version, the
prosecution may be required to establish the defendant's criminal
disposition. To assert a person, P, has a disposition to do X is to assert that
if certain hypothetical conditions existed, P would do X. Under the
objective test, the defendant must show the effect of the police conduct on a
hypothetical law-abiding actor. The critical questions of each version of the
defense neatly compare as follows:
Subjective - Would the crime have likely occurred if the defendant had been placed
in a hypothetical set of circumstances without the police agent's excessive
encouragement toward crime?
49 See Park, supra note 14, at 204 ("An agent's knowledge that his target has a weakness
for a vice crime but is currently abstaining is surely a fact that merits consideration when
assessing the agent's conduct.").




Objective - Would the crime have likely occurred if the police agent had been placed
in a hypothetical set of circumstances without the defendant's excessive inclination
toward crime?
The tests are the mirror images of each other.
Turning to the application of the tests, there are two potential
categories of cases where the objective and subjective versions of
entrapment may diverge. The first is cases where the defendant is entitled
to only the subjective version of the defense. Such cases may arise because
the subjective version formally does not require the high level of
encouragement required by the objective test (encouragement sufficient to
affect an average citizen)--just inducement without predisposition. Thus,
there might be perpetrators found to be subjected to only minimal
encouragement (and hence ineligible for the objective defense) yet still be
subject to inducement and also nondisposed (hence entitled to the
subjective defense). Accordingly, Professor Park has written that "[f]ederal
law is more favorable to nondisposed defendants who succumbed to
inducements not sufficiently compelling to be deemed improper [under the
objective standard]. '
The potential class of defendants favored by the subjective version,
however, is likely very small. In order to be eligible for the subjective
version of the test, a person must not be predisposed to commit the crime.
If the nondisposed are defined as those not ready and willing to commit the
crime, there will be no defendants who qualify for the subjective version
unless they were exposed to an inducement powerful enough to create a risk
for those not otherwise ready and willing. They would then qualify for the
objective version as well. This convergence of the tests follows from the
subjective version's tendency, discussed earlier, 2 to require a strong
inducement to avoid the inference-fatal to defendant's claim-of
predisposition.
For example, in United States v. Jacobson,3 the Supreme Court found
that, as a matter of law, the defendant had established the entrapment
defense in its subjective version. The defendant had been induced to order
child pornography as a result of an elaborate government sting operation.
The defendant had never purchased child pornography previously. Only
after a two and a half year campaign involving mailings from five fictitious
organizations and a bogus pen pal did the defendant place his order.54 On
51 Park, supra note 14, at 199.
52 See supra text accompanying note 35.
13 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
54 Id. at 542-47.
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these facts, the Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to
violating the Child Protection Act of 1984, which criminalizes the knowing
receipt through the mails of a "visual depiction [that] involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct."' 5  Now imagine that
subsequently United States Congress adopts the objective version of the
entrapment defense and, shortly thereafter, the FBI employs similar tactics
against a person with a provable predisposition to possess child
pornography. The defendant in this hypothetical case should be able to
establish the entrapment defense in its new objective form. In order to
demonstrate that the FBI's conduct "creates a substantial risk that such an
offense would be committed by persons other than those ready to commit
it," 56 the defendant would need only cite Jacobson, where a person found to
be nondisposed to commit the offense actually did commit it. If the class of
law-abiding citizens subsumes the class of nondisposed persons,
satisfaction of the subjective test should entail the satisfaction of the
objective test. The objective test's placement of the burden of proof on the
defendant, compared to the subjective test's placement on the government
of the critical predisposition issue, would then account for cases satisfying
the subjective test only.57
The second class of cases where the two tests potentially divide
comprises those cases where the defendant would succeed under the
objective test but fail under the subjective test. In such cases, the
government agent's conduct would be judged sufficient to induce a
nondisposed person, and so entitle the defendant to acquittal under the
objective version, but the defendant herself would be judged predisposed,
and hence not qualify for the subjective test.
This too may be a small class of cases. Professor Seidman believes
that it will be because the conduct alleged to be entrapment may be
described in a manner that minimizes the possibility that a person not ready
and willing might be induced by such conduct.5 8 For example, the agent's
conduct may be described as "offering a tremendous amount of money to a
person strongly suspected of imminent criminal activity." If such a
description is permitted, then despite the strength of the inducement, there
is little chance that that very act would cause an innocent person to commit
a crime since the inducement definitionally was not likely to be directed at
" 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A) (1984).
56 See supra text accompanying notes 39-40 and 48.
57 See supra text accompanying notes 16 and 48.
51 See Louis Michael Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal
Justice Dilemma, 1981 SUP. CT. REv. 11I, 119-20 (1981).
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such a person.5 9  There is some support for this interpretation of the
objective test.60 Under such an interpretation, the only cases where the
objective version would result in acquittal where the subjective would not
would be cases where the government inducement was directed at a person
thought to be nondisposed, but in fact the person was predisposed. As
discussed below, these "lucky hit" cases-cases where the police
unknowingly entrap a criminally disposed person-may be few.
Professor Allen also thinks that practically there will be few cases in
which the objective version provides a defense, but the subjective version
would not.61 Allen argues that the inquiries under both tests will in practice
be similar. Where the fact-finder concludes that the inducement was
sufficient to cause an average person to act (hence qualifying the defendant
under the objective test), the fact-finder would likely have found the
defendant nondisposed (hence entitling any induced defendant to the
subjective defense) because it lacks evidence of criminality absent improper
62encouragement. In other words, the excessive inducement directed at a
predisposed person deprives the prosecution of the critical inference of
criminal act to criminal predisposition. The excessive inducement is an
alternative plausible explanation of the criminal act. Likewise, where the
fact-finder concludes that the defendant was predisposed (hence
disqualifying the defendant from the subjective defense), it would likely not
have found the inducement to be entrapment under the objective test
63because there is no evidence of the effect of the test on an average person.
While these points have weight, they likely go too far. Consider
Allen's argument that cases satisfying the objective test will satisfy the
subjective test. While the most salient evidence of predisposition may be
responding to a low level inducement, evidence such as past or subsequent
59 Id.
60 Park agrees and writes, "[t]he substantiality of the risk created cannot be assessed
without considering the surrounding circumstances, including facts about the target that were
known to the agent." Park, supra note 14, at 205-08 (discussing Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d
226, 229 (Alaska 1969) (prior conduct of selling relevant to whether police conduct was
acceptable under objective test) and People v. Turner, 210 N.W.2d 336, 338 (Mich. 1973)
(defendant's statements about heroine relevant to determining whether police conduct was
acceptable under objective test)).
61 See Ronald J. Allen, Clarifying Entrapment, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407, 412-
13(1999).
62 See id. Contrast this claim-that a strong enough inducement to establish the
objective version of the defense will usually satisfy the subjective version-with my earlier
inverse claim--that the satisfaction of the subjective version will usually involve a strong
inducement. See supra text accompanying note 35.
63 Allen, supra note 61, at 412-13.
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criminal acts could support a finding of predisposition even in cases of high
inducement. 64 For example, in Posner v. United States,65 the government
was permitted to introduce evidence that defendant had attempted to buy
drugs three and a half months after the crime he was charged with
committing.66 Such evidence can be quite probative of predisposition.
Thus it is conceivable that even where a defendant had been induced by
very powerful persuasion (hence entitled to the objective defense), she
could be found predisposed (hence not entitled to the subjective defense).
There is a more mundane reason why there will be few cases that
establish objective entrapment, but not subjective entrapment. Objective
entrapment requires a high level of persuasiveness, such as an appeal from a
close friend; subjective entrapment occurs when a nondisposed person is
subject to an inducement. It will be rare that high levels of persuasion
(qualifying for objective entrapment) will be directed against predisposed
persons (ineligible for subjective entrapment). Simply put, the use of such
high levels would be overkill. Because the defendant is predisposed, lower
levels would suffice to induce the criminal conduct necessary for
conviction. Furthermore, lower levels would be less likely to arouse the
suspicions of the target that he was being entrapped. For example, offering
unusually high amounts of money for drugs may suggest an ulterior
purpose. Finally, lower levels would be more useful in obtaining a
conviction because they would not mask critical evidence of predisposition.
The police could only be expected to use such unnecessarily strong
inducements where they mistakenly think their target is nondisposed, but to
their surprise, he is predisposed. These lucky hit cases will be rare if only
because persons predisposed to particular crime are relatively rare in the
general population.
In sum, the most common cases of entrapment, under either version,
will be when the police use (A) generally compelling inducements against
(B) nondisposed persons. Under the subjective version, (B) is required, and
assuming (B), (A) will usually be needed for the inducement to result in the
defendant's acting criminally in the first place. Under the objective version,
(A) is required and usually there will be (B), for why else bother with (A)?
The Article's analysis of entrapment will therefore concentrate on cases
with compelling inducements turned against nondisposed persons. These
cases represent the lion's share of entrapment cases under either version.
64 Evidence of such acts is admissible in federal court to establish predisposition. Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b).
65 865 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1989).
66 Id. at 657-58.
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III. STANDARD THEORIES OF ENTRAPMENT
This Article began examining the problematic nature of the entrapment
defense. It pointed out that the success of the defense turned on the status
of the tempting party: If private party, conviction; if government agent,
acquittal. Yet the significance of the status of the tempting party was not
readily apparent. Why should cases of "private entrapment" be treated
differently from cases of "government entrapment?, 67  This Part of the
Article canvasses the standard theories of entrapment. These theories may
be divided into retributivist, utilitarian, civil rights, and autonomy theories.
Each theory may be understood, in part, as an attempt to give significance
to the status of the tempter. As discussed below, each theory is open to
serious challenge.
A. ENTRAPMENT AND RETRIBUTIVISM
Retributivism is a theory about punishment. Many believe retributivist
concerns underlie the criminal law. 68 Briefly stated, retributivists believe
that the imposition of criminal sanctions is justified to the extent the
sanctions are deserved. 69 A retributivist theory of the entrapment defense
67 As used in this Article, "private entrapment" refers to conduct, circumstances, and
responses thereto involving a private party such that if that party were a government agent,
then under the law of the jurisdiction, the defendant would be able to establish the
entrapment defense. For example, if in an objective jurisdiction, a nondisposed person is
enticed into crime by a private individual offering an inducement an ordinary citizen would
be unlikely to resist, that person would be privately entrapped. Private entrapment does not
require that the entrapping individual act with the purpose or hope that the entrapped
individual will be prosecuted because this is not a general requirement of entrapment under
standard formulations. If the mailings sent in Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540
(1992); see supra text accompanying notes 7-8, had been sent by state law enforcement
agents merely in an attempt to infiltrate an imagined child pornography network, Jacobson's
claim in the subsequent federal prosecution should have been affected.
68 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT at 36-41 (April 11, 2003) (endorsing a
theory of form of retributivism which allows the consideration of utilitarian factors to
resolve retributive uncertainty); David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA
L. Rev. 1623, 1623 (1992) (claiming that retributivism "has enjoyed in recent years so
vigorous a revival that it can fairly be regarded today as the leading philosophical
justification of the institution of criminal punishment"); see also CAL. PENAL CODE §
I170(a)(1) (West 2003) ("The Legislature finds and declares that the purpose of
imprisonment for crime is punishment."). Although currently enjoying popularity,
retributivism is not without its critics. See Russell Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The
Injustice of "Just" Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 843 (2002).
69 Joel Feinberg, The Classic Debate, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 727, 727-29 (Joel Feinberg
& Jules Coleman eds., 6th ed. 2000); FLETCHER, supra note 12, at 459-60; MICHAEL MOORE,
PLACING BLAME 87 (1997).
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would justify the defense on the ground that those who are entrapped do not
deserve the harsh treatment that attends conviction. Although there are
many varieties of retributivism, 70 retributivists generally analyze desert as a
function of the gravity of the wrongdoing at issue and the actor's culpability
for that wrong.71 Logically then, a retributivist theory of entrapment would
maintain that the defense is sound because the entrapped party has done no
wrong or, alternatively, is not to blame for the wrong done. These
retributivist approaches to entrapment are considered in turn.
1. Wrongdoing-Based Theories of Entrapment
Professor Carlson pursues the first approach. He advances the view
that the entrapment defense is valid from a retributivist perspective because
"the assumption of wrongfulness must fail in most instances of government
involvement. 7 1 Carlson equates wrongful conduct with conduct that harms
or threatens protected social interests. In contrast to cases of private
entrapment, Carlson observes, cases of government entrapment are
initiated, directed, monitored, and orchestrated by the police. The
government inevitably will step in to make the arrest before the crime can
be consummated. Thus, in contrast to cases of private entrapment, there is
virtually no chance that any social interest will be harmed, and so, Carlson
argues, from a retributive perspective, punishment is not deserved.73
Carlson takes too narrow a view of retributivism. Although Carlson
considers one variation-contract retributivism-he fails to consider
another, subjective retributivism. According to subjective retributivism, the
wrongfulness of a person's conduct is to be evaluated from the epistemic
position of the actor, that is, what the actor thought he was doing.74 The
dispute between subjective retributivists and objective retributivists (those
70 One basic distinction between retributivist theories is the distinction between strong
and weak brands of retributivism. Strong brands assert that desert is a sufficient condition of
punishment; weak brands assert it is merely a necessary condition. See Christopher, supra
note 68, at 865-66. Because the Article's discussion of retributivism equally applies to both
versions, the distinction shall be ignored.
71 See FLETCHER, supra note 12, at 461; MooRE, supra note 69, at 168.
72 Jonathon C. Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment
Defense, 73 VA. L. REV. 1011, 1063 (1987).
73 Id.
74 For the distinction between subjective (or culpability/intent-based theories) and
objective (or harm/wrongdoing-based theories) retributivism, see Kevin Cole, Killings
During Crime: Toward a Discriminating Theory of Strict Liability, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 73,
74-76 (1990), and Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237, 237 (1994) (distinguishing culpability and wrongdoing as
independent bases of desert).
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who believe that the wrongfulness of conduct is to be judged based on what
actually occurred) is far from settled. 5 Subjective retributivists have a
strong claim to giving the superior account of punishment for unsuccessful
attempts, a universal feature of modem criminal law. A person who
attempts a crime believes that her conduct creates a risk of the crime being
completed. The subjectivist explains such a person deserved to be punished
based on her acting on such belief. In contrast, objective retributivists must
struggle to defend the claim that in such cases of unsuccessful attempts the
person's conduct was objectively wrongful. Often the riskiness of the
person's conduct is appealed to. From a God's eye point of view, where all
facts are taken into account, however, the risk that an unsuccessful attempt
would succeed was zero. The ascription of risk is relative to a vantage
point with limited access to the facts. Any other vantage point than God's,
where all the facts are known, however, appears morally arbitrary. Thus,
objective retributivism founders on the shoals of unsuccessful attempts.7 6
Subjectivism in turn can be criticized on the ground that it fails to account
for the common intuition that unsuccessful attempts should be punished less
than completed ones. Nevertheless, in light of the weaknesses of its
competitor, it is at least a viable form of retributivism. From at least the
perspective of subjective retributivism, those governmentally entrapped
deserve punishment just like other morally culpable defendants who fail to
commit the crimes they intended.
75 Compare Joel Feinberg, Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts: Some Bad but
Instructive Arguments Against It, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 117, 119 (1995) (arguing that
uncompleted attempts and completed crimes should be treated similarly), and Sanford H.
Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 679, 684-86 (1994) (same); with Leo Katz, Why the Successful Assassin Is
More Wicked than the Unsuccessful One, 88 CAL. L. REV. 791, 795 (2000), and MOORE,
supra note 69, at 191-247 (arguing results are relevant to desert).
76 See Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 17-21
(1994) (attacking the risk account of wrong-doing on these grounds). Antony Duff, in a
leading work on the law of criminal attempts, takes the position that criminal attempts
constitute attacks, which even when unsuccessful, are objectively wrongful. See R.A. DUFF,
CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 221 (1996). It is unclear, however, how Duff sustains his claim that
attacks are inevitably harmful. Id. at 368. For example, a bullet fired which narrowly misses
its victim and falls undetected into the sea may be considered an attack from the perspective
of a hypothetical reasonable observer. See id. at 82. However, such an occurrence would
not appear to be harmful in any sense that would support punishment under any reasonably
full-blooded version of objective retributivism.
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2. Culpability-Based Theories of Entrapment
Most retributive theories of entrapment focus on retributivism's
culpability requirement. Such theories explain the defense on the ground
that those entrapped are not blameworthy. Such a theory may be imputed
to the United States Supreme Court, which has repeatedly described those
entrapped as "innocents. 77 In retributivist terms, innocence negates the
blameworthiness required for punishment. Likewise commentators
supporting the subjective version of entrapment defense have taken the
position that defendants should not be held liable because they are not
blameworthy. In a much cited article, Professor Park argues for the
superiority of the subjective version of the entrapment defense. 71 In the
course of the article, he examines various possible justifications of the
entrapment defense. According to Park's theory, the defense is justified
because those who are entrapped do not meet the retributivist requirements
for punishment. To Park, "it seems obvious that they are less
blameworthy... than the ordinary offender. Since they are less
blameworthy, they are less deserving of retributive punishment. 79
a. Culpability and the Problem of Private Entrapment
An initial objection to this theory is that it seems inconsistent with the
fact that the criminal law provides no defense to persons in cases of private
entrapment. It is commonly assumed that those who are governmentally
entrapped and those who are privately entrapped equally deserve
punishment.80 Retributivists believe that an individual's culpability for
risky or harmful conduct is based on his subjective attitude toward the risk
or harm. For example, in the absence of an excuse or justification, a person
who desires to cause the harm is culpable for it. Call this the subjectivity of
77 See Jacobson v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 1535, 1547 (1992) (defense available if jury
determines defendant just "innocent dupe"); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372
(1958) (distinguishing between "unwary innocent" and "unwary criminal"); Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932) (finding where disposition to crime is implanted in
mind of "innocent person").
78 See Park, supra note 14.
79 Id. at 240. Park also identifies lack of dangerousness of those entrapped as a ground
for the defense. Id. The majority of his discussion, however, emphasizes lack of
blameworthiness. Id. at 242 (arguing defense "properly concerned with culpability"); id. at
239 (asserting "injustice" of convicting "nondisposed persons"); id at 265 (noting his theory
seeks to "excuse" entrapped).
80 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.13 cmt. at 406 ("Defendants
who are aided, solicited, deceived or persuaded by police officials stand in the same moral
position as those who are aided, solicited, deceived or persuaded by other persons ... ").
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culpability principle. 8  Invariably, individuals who are entrapped by
government agents, like individuals who are entrapped by private parties,
believe that the person offering the inducement is a private party.
Governmentally and privately entrapped individuals share the same
subjective beliefs about the circumstances surrounding their illegal conduct,
and therefore, all things equal, are equally culpable. Yet private entrapment
is no defense. This fact implies that the privately entrapped person is
culpable for his conduct, and, based on the subjectivity of culpability
principle, that the governmentally entrapped person is culpable too.
Park is keenly aware of the above argument and the challenge it poses
to his position. 82 Rather than attempting to distinguish cases of government
and private entrapment based on considerations of culpability, Park adopts
an ingenious strategy. Conceding that those privately entrapped are
nonculpable just like those governmentally entrapped, Park argues that
"rules intended to excuse nonculpable persons from criminal liability must
sometimes be limited in scope because of the danger of contrived
defenses."83 Park analogizes to the mistake of law defense. Although those
who are misled by private parties regarding to law seem no less culpable
that those who are misled by public officials, the law-arguably
justifiably-only extends the defense to the latter group. The reason for
this limitation is that courts are afraid that otherwise there would be too
many cases of persons successfully presenting a false entrapment claim to
the jury or engaging in criminal conduct in the hope they will be able to do
so.
84 Likewise, Park argues, even though those privately entrapped are not
culpable, the law properly does not allow them to assert the entrapment
S In limited circumstances, the criminal law will hold a person liable for harms that the
actor lacked a subjective attitude toward. A person may be liable for negligence homicide if
she causes a death where she failed to be aware her conduct risked the life of another and a
reasonable person would have been aware of that risk. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4. A
person's culpability for negligence, however, is still strictly a function of subjective factors
such as the defendant's awareness of evidence or circumstances that should have led her to
appreciate the risk. See id. § 2.02(2)(d) (determination of negligence turns on the
"circumstances known" to the actor).
82 In contrast to Park, Carlson believes the governmentally entrapped are morally
culpable. Running Park's argument in reverse, Carlson believes this result is necessary
because otherwise the privately entrapped would be equally entitled to the defense. Carlson,
supra note 72, at 1038. Seidman also makes this argument. See Seidman, supra note 58, at
132 ("We know that there is no generally held normative principle precluding punishment of
defendants succumbing to even very attractive inducements, because a defendant offered
such an inducement by a private person has no defense to the resulting charge.").
83 Park, supra note 14, at 241.
84 See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.04 cmt. at 280.
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defense. To do so would create an unacceptably high risk of abuse in the
form of collusion and false claims.
Park's argument is open to challenge. The criminal law is deeply
committed to punishing only those who deserve punishment, at least where
significant penalties are involved. Retributive limits on punishment are not
so easily overridden by speculative claims that recognizing those limits in
cases of private entrapment will lead to abuse. The limitation of the
mistake of law defense to those who have been misled by public officials is
not universally accepted. 5 Furthermore, to the extent it is accepted, the
limitation need not be understood as an example of policy-based concerns
of defense abuse trumping valid retributive limits. As a general matter,
those who rely on the misrepresentation of public officials are in fact less
culpable than those who rely on the misrepresentations of private parties. It
is more reasonable to rely on the representations of those legally charged
with stating the law because they are usually more knowledgeable. Those
who rely on the representation of private parties, know, or should know,
they are doing so at their own risk. There is at least a significant subjective
difference between those who rely on private and government statements of
the law. This difference, rather than public policy concerns, can account for
limitation of the mistake of law defense. Accordingly, it is far from clear
that the government-agent limitation of the entrapment defense can
satisfactorily be explained based on policy-based concerns of abuse.86
The difficulty with Park's position, however, runs deeper. Park never
attempts to defend what he takes to be the "obvious '8 7 fact that those who
are entrapped (governmentally or privately) are nonculpable. Consider a
person who is either not predisposed to crime and yet yields to a
necessarily powerful temptation (under the subjective version) or who is
subjected to a temptation that even a reasonable person might well yield to
(under the objective version). Is there any reason to believe that this
85 See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-4(c)(3) (West 1995) (extending defense to any person who
"diligently pursues all means available to ascertain the meaning and application of the
offense to his conduct and honestly and in good faith concludes his conduct is not an offense
in circumstances in which a law-abiding and prudent person would also so conclude").
86 Park, supra note 14, at 241. Park also argues that limiting the defense to those
governmentally entrapped is justified because of other policy-related concerns that
distinguish cases of government and private entrapment, such as possible wasteful use of
police resources and the chilling effect on political activity. Id. at 242-43. These other
public-policy rationales are addressed infra Parts III.B-C.
87 Park, supra note 14, at 240.
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person, who has deliberately chosen wrongly,"8 should not be considered
nonculpable? Although intuitions differ sharply on the question, 9
commentators have given it insufficient attention.90 At best, the question is
controversial, especially when considered in the context of the most
difficult case: the enticement of a person of ordinary resistance.
Below the Article considers two potentially attractive arguments for
the position that those who are entrapped are not culpable: the first based on
an analogy to duress, the second based on considerations of the practical
limits of character. Although the arguments are ultimately rejected, their
prima facie appeal may explain why some courts and commentators, such
88 There is no requirement under either version of the entrapment defense that the
defendant's ability to reason was somehow overcome by the offer, so that the defendant
acted "in the heat of passion," or, more relevantly, the heat of greed.
89 Fletcher, for example, apparently disagrees with Park, in contrast, asserting in his
discussion of entrapment that "succumbing to temptation is a paradigm case of blameworthy
conduct." FLETCHER, supra note 12, at 542. Professor Park takes the opposite position that
there is "no accepted notion of culpability applicable to a person" who is entrapped. Allen,
supra note 61, at 416. Little argument, however, is provided to support these claims.
90 Although Carlson considers the issue, his analysis is not satisfactory. Carlson, contra
Park, believes that the entrapped are morally culpable. He begins with the premise that in
subjective entrapment jurisdictions, the law correctly ascribes culpability to a predisposed
person who is induced to crime. According to Carlson, if a predisposed person is
blameworthy, so should be the nondisposed person who responds to the same inducement.
After all, Carlson reasons, in contrast to the predisposed who are naturally susceptible to
inducements (such as the pedophile), the nondisposed have no excuse for yielding to a given
temptation. Carlson, supra note 72, at 1038.
Carlson rejects any attempt to elevate the nondisposed over the predisposed due to the
latter's arguable moral inferiority for being predisposed to crime. Carlson writes that
"[b]lame in the criminal law is not normally assessed through an examination of the actor's
underlying character or criminal propensities." Id. at 1041. Accordingly, Carlson believes
that just as it would be inconsistent with the criminal law's narrow focus to convict based on
propensity alone, e.g., sexual attraction to children, so it would be inconsistent to excuse the
entrapped on the ground of their lack of propensity. Carlson's characterization of the
criminal law's approach to culpability, however, is only partially correct. The determination
of prima facie culpability is an extremely narrow inquiry. Offense definitions usually only
require a showing of intent or recklessness, two discrete subjective mental states that must
exist concurrently with the conduct. Excuses, however, traditionally allow for a much
broader inquiry. They allow the defendant an opportunity to show that, for one reason or
another, his cases is an exception to the broad rules of thumb for culpability established by
the offense definitions. Although the criminal law is concerned in the first instance with
whether the definition of the offense has been satisfied, it is, as Carlson ultimately
acknowledges, id. at 1042 n. 115, concerned at bottom with quality of character and virtue.
The general lack of criminal propensities of the entrapped should not be bracketed off when




as Park, have taken the position that those qualifying for the entrapment
defense should not be blamed for engaging in criminal acts.
b. Culpability and Duress
The first argument for the nonculpability of the entrapped is based on
an analogy between entrapment and duress. It proceeds as follows:
Argument from Duress
Persons who engage in prohibited conduct as a result of significant threats are
entitled to the defense of duress. Depending on the jurisdiction, significant threats
are threats of serious bodily injury or threats a person of reasonable firmness
would not be able to resist. The duress defense is best construed an excuse
defense, that is, it is grounded on the principle that the actor is not culpable for his
act because he did not have a fair opportunity to not engage in it. There was no
fair opportunity because of the significant sanction that was being faced.
Likewise, persons who engage in prohibited conduct as a result of a significant
offer (whether made by a government agent or private party) should be found
nonculpable and be entitled to a defense. Here a "significant offer" might mean an
offer of equivalent value to not being seriously harmed or of a magnitude that a
person of reasonable firmness would not be able to resist. Because of the
attractiveness of the offer, there was no fair opportunity to resist. Acquittal based
on the defendant's nonculpability is therefore warranted.
The Argument from Duress rests on the initial premise that the persons
subject to duress are not liable because they lacked a fair opportunity to act
lawfully. This premise is somewhat controversial.92 Accepting it for the
91 The preceding argument for nonculpability provides a straightforward account of why
a nondisposed person does not deserve to be punished: in light of the magnitude of the offer,
he is not blameworthy. The argument, however, appears less successful in explaining why a
predisposed person deserves to be acquitted, as he would be under the objective version of
the defense. Nevertheless, it may be extended by adding the following premise: A person is
only culpable for an act if he engaged in it as a result of a character flaw, where "as a result"
implies the flaw was a but-for cause of the act. This premise is plausible, at least on
character theories of culpability which ground desert in the manifestation of bad character.
See. e.g, FLETCHER, supra note 12, at 800 (recommending character theory); George Vuoso,
Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 YALE L.J. 1661 (1987) (same); Michael D.
Bayles, Character, Purpose and Criminal Responsibility, I LAW & PHIL. 5 (1982) (same).
Where a predisposed actor had responded to enticements strong enough to overcome the
resistance of a law-abiding citizen, the actor's bad character cannot be inferred from his
conduct-a nondisposed person would have acted similarly. Thus, if the Duress Argument is
sound for nondisposed actors, it may also account on retributivist grounds for the acquittal of
predisposed actors under the objective version of entrapment. In any case, as argued earlier,
see supra text accompanying notes 58-65, most defendants who qualify for the objective
version will in fact be nondisposed.
92 Professor LaFave takes the view that the duress is not an excuse defense based on lack
of fair opportunity to comply with the law, but a justification defense based on the necessity
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sake of argument, we may focus on the more interesting question whether
the argument correctly equates acting based on threats and offers. Threats
and offers clearly have much in common. Both threats and offers provide
reasons that potentially bear powerfully on a person's decisions by making
a change in the actor's utility dependent on her choice regarding a course of
action.
Nevertheless, threats and offers are clearly distinguishable. In his
discussion of entrapment, Professor Seidman explains the distinction is that
offers expand the range of choices, while threats contract the range of
choices.93  Construed literally, this distinction appears dubious. While
threats make one option (not engaging in the requested conduct) less
attractive, it is still an option. Furthermore, even if this distinction is
accepted as a matter of definition, it is unclear why it should make a moral
difference. Seidman suggests the morally critical fact is that one has a right
not to be threatened, but not a right to be free of an offer.94 As a matter of
rights, this may be so. But why should this moral distinction between the
permissibility of threats and offers carry over to the response to them? In
his analysis of the offer/threat distinction, Seidman considers confrontations
between homeowners and burglars.95 Seidman points out that homeowners
may legally avoid harm by resisting burglars, but burglars may not legally
realize a benefit by taking from homeowners. Homeowners are facing the
threat of losing goods; burglars are facing the enticement of gaining goods.
Although they both may face the same attraction to the same material goods
of the defendant's conduct to avoid the comparatively great threatened harm. See LAFAVE,
supra note 5, at 473-74. His view is supported by the common law formulation of the
defense, which requires a serious threat and does not extend to murder. See id. at 474.
Professor Dressier takes the opposite view, asserting that duress is an excuse for engaging in
even unjustified criminal acts. Joshua Dressier, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying
the Excuse and Searching for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1359-60 (1989).
His view is supported by the Model Penal Code formulation of the defense which would
allow a jury to grant the defense even in cases of justified conduct, for example the
defendant's killing of two to save himself. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (permitting
defense for where "a person of reasonable firmness in [the defendant's] situation would have
been unable to resist [the threat]"). To the extent that duress is really a justification, it
cannot provide a useful analogy to understand entrapment. There may be cases where
yielding to a threat is justified in the sense of yielding being the lesser evil. If a person faces
death if he does not aid a plan to embezzle $10,000, his aiding would be justified. It is,
however, difficult to imagine cases whether an enticed person could argue justification. The
advantage of the offer could hardly offset the harm of the offense. A person would not be
offered $20,000 to aid a plan to embezzle $10,000.
93 See Seidman, supra note 58, at 133.
94 See id. at 134.
9' See id. at 133.
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of the homeowner, only the burglar will be liable for acts to secure those
goods. Seidman explains this asymmetry on the ground that homeowners
face a threat of loss while burglars experience merely the opportunity for
gain.96 This asymmetry, however, does not support or explain a general
distinction between those who respond to threats and those who respond to
offers. Homeowners may use force to defend their property because such
action is justified; burglars may not use force against the homeowner to
acquire property because such action is not justified. The law's right-based
distinction between homeowners and burglars (who confront equally
compelling motivations) therefore does not explain or illuminate the
distinction being those wrongdoers who act because of a threat and those
who act because of an offer. Seidman's analysis of entrapment as an
expansion of options seems to be conceptually accurate, but lacks the
normative punch necessary to refute the Argument from Duress's equating
of duress and entrapment.
An alternative basis for morally distinguishing the effect of threats and
offers is made by the philosopher Robert Nozick. Nozick suggests that the
critical difference between threats and offers is that one would always
choose to be made an offer-it can never hurt to have the option-but not
choose to be subjected to threat. Approving, at least implicitly, the offer
that led to the action, one should be held responsible for the action no
matter how compelling the offer.97 Being the recipient of an offer, no
matter how overpoweringly tempting, one can no more defeat
accountability, Nozick might argue, than acting based on a hypnotic
suggestion that the person requested to have implanted in him. In contrast,
the threat was unwelcome. If encountering it could have been avoided, it
would have been. Because one lacked a fair opportunity to avoid the threat,
one may have lacked a fair opportunity to avoid complying with the threat.
Thus the target of a threat, unlike the target of an offer, has a valid excuse
for his wrongdoing.
The difficulty with Nozick's argument is that it just pushes the
problem back a level. Nozick's analysis focuses not only on the choice
between the act and the consequence of not acting, but the hypothetical
choice between whether to have the choice or not. It is true that if asked
whether we would want an offer involving a potential benefit, we would
choose to have the offer, while we would not choose to be exposed to a
96 id.
97 Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
ERNEST NAGEL 440 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969). For a detailed conceptual
analysis of the concept of coercion, the reader is directed to Mitchell N. Berman, The
Normative Functions of Coercion Claims, 8 LEGAL THEORY 45 (2002).
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threat. But this is only because we are informed that the offer will be
attractive and we anticipate that we might accept it. If we cannot be blamed
for not refusing an extremely attractive offer itself, we cannot be blamed for
hypothetically choosing to be made such an offer. It is the same attraction
to the ultimate benefit that motivates both choices. If we cannot be faulted
for yielding to powerful threats because these, in appealing to our self-
interest, deny us a fair opportunity to resist, then we cannot be faulted for
yielding to equally compelling offers on the ground that these offers were
"welcomed." We had no more a fair opportunity to find the offers
unwelcome in the first place than to resist them once made.
Is there then no satisfying response to the Argument from Duress's
equating threats with equally compelling offers? I suggest the normative
basis for the distinction begins with Nozick's and Seidman's observations
that, as a general matter, we are adverse to receiving threats and have the
right not to be threatened. Where a person is unlawfully threatened, we
properly feel sorry for the targeted person because he is in a position in
which he should not have to be. This feeling of compassion then is
manifested by generously granting the threat's target an exemption from the
usual punishment that follows from his unjustified yielding to the threat.
Leniency toward the coerced is, if not strictly deserved, at least an
appropriate act of charity. In contrast, the person who yields to an offer,
something generally advantageous, has no claim to sympathy. 98 The reason
the yielding to threats, but not offers, is excusable may also be tied to the
idea that society has failed the one threatened. Society seeks to protect
persons from unlawful threats. Having itself failed to protect the target of
the threat from the threat, society should not, as a matter of equity, punish
the person for yielding to the threat. This equitable theory of the duress
defense might be a strange form of payback, but it has some intuitive
resonance. 99 If it is correct, it constitutes a more persuasive refutation of the
Argument from Duress than those previously offered.
98 While enticements to crime are legally prohibited, they are not considered a wrong
against the person solicited, but a wrong against the would-be victim of the solicited crimes.
The target of a solicitation, whether accepted or not, cannot bring a tort claim against the
person making the offer alleging that he was harmed by the offer.
99 See Sanford H. Kadish, Respectfor Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law,




c. Culpability and Character Development
Here is a second possible argument why those who are entrapped,
whether privately or governmentally, are not morally blameworthy and so
should not be punished.
Argument from Limited Resources
As a general matter, the criminal law excuses individuals who have made a
reasonable effort to comply with the law. For example, persons who engage in
prohibited conduct because they have made a reasonable mistake of fact are not
culpable. An actor will not be criminally liable for shooting a person if the actor
reasonably believed that he was either shooting a scarecrow or reasonably believed
the victim was unlawfully attacking him with lethal force. The law does not
demand omniscience. Likewise, the law does not demand "old heads on young
shoulders"' 00 and will take the youth of a defendant into account when judging the
reasonableness of his conduct. Finally, the law does not demand heroism. Under
the duress defense, a person will not be held liable for committing a crime because
of undue pressure.
The reason for granting these excuses turns on the fact that we bear some
responsibility for developing our characters and abilities. Choosing the type of
person we will be is not as easy as choosing an action of a specific occasion.
Nevertheless, as we go through life, we make innumerable micro-decisions
concerning how we will develop our characters and abilities. Excuses reflect the
law's recognition that even if we make all the appropriate decisions regarding
development, we will still be limited, fallible and imperfect. This is so if only
because there must be some trade-offs among virtues. There are many virtues
worth developing: prudence, self-discipline, courage, tolerance, sensitivity,
judgment, loyalty, etc. Not all can be developed to the maximum extent. The
opportunity cost of reading an inspiring biography of Ghandi may be foregoing a
training session for a marathon run, a morning at church, or time with one's
children. The greater development of some virtues some will result in lesser
development of others. Once we have made the correct decision concerning the
degree to develop various virtues, we should not be blamed for the resultant
limitation of other virtues
In light of this theory of excuses, those who yield to offers of the type necessary to
establish the entrapment defense-those strong enough either to induce the
nondisposed (under the subjective version) or to overcome the resistance of a law-
abiding citizen (under the objective version)-should be considered blameless.
Persons cannot be expected to develop more than a reasonable degree of resistance
to temptation. In particular, expending too much effort at developing this virtue
might result in the development of a character that was stodgy, stoic, distant, or
lacking in appreciation of the world's offerings. One cannot be blamed for
yielding to temptation where one has done all that reasonably should be done to
steel one's character. While the decision to accept the enticement may be wrong,




the lifestyle decisions that produced it may be right. Appropriate action at this
more abstract level of decision-making excuses the actor's conduct.
This argument, though attractive in theory, likely goes too far.
Doubtless we must take responsibility for developing our characters,'0 ' or at
least failing to change our character flaws, 10 2 and, through no fault of our
own, some virtues will be less well developed than they might have been
had more effort been made. Nevertheless, if relative to a given situation
they are deficient, we cannot disown the deficiency on the ground we did
our best to develop our characters given what we had to work with. We
cannot blame our bad choices on our characters because, for better or
worse, we are our characters.'0 3 There is no characterless metaphysical ego
that we can identify ourselves with in order to distance ourselves from our
character. To assert so would be equivalent to claiming that "you" could
have been born to different parents at a completely different time and place.
Character, as much as parents and circumstances of birth, is constitutive of
self-identity. This conceptual fact has moral implications. Just as you
cannot legitimately blame your mother for not bearing "you" ten years later
with a different father, regardless of the objective fault of her decision, so
you cannot blame your character for your decisions regardless of the
objective fault of your character. From the fact that we, as mortals, possess
limited virtue only follows that we, as mortals, must sometimes be
blameworthy for the wrongful acts that manifest this limit.
This view of character underlies much of the criminal law. For
example, there is no rotten social background defense.' °4 Lack of social
'0' See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICs, bk.1Il, ch.5., translated in THE BASIC WORKS
OF ARISTOTLE (Richard McKeon ed., 1941) (discussing a person's power to develop virtues
or vices and so at least partial responsibility for character); see also TERENCE IRWIN,
ARISTOTLE'S FIRST PRINCIPLES § 182, at 344 (1988) (interpreting this chapter of Aristotle);
Kyron Huigens, Nietzsche and Aretaic Legal Theory, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 563, 575 (2003);
Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between
Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511 (1992).
102 See ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 396 (1981) (arguing that even if
a person may sometimes not be blamed for acquiring a character defect, he may be blamed
for failing to cure it).
103 See Michael S. Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL. 29, 50
(1990) (making point in context of claim that persons not responsible for character because
of causal determinism).
104 See United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding
instruction that jury should not be concerned with whether the defendant had "a rotten social
background"). See generally Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the
Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9
(1985).
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resources does not excuse bad character. The best of us may become
corrupted if unlucky enough. Indeed, the corruption of the innocent by the
environment must happen all the time, unless we believe that some people
are intrinsically or congenitally evil. This is one aspect of moral luck. We
take responsibility for who we are, even if it is not our fault for who we
are.
1 0 5
An analogy from the law of homicide also may be illuminating. The
criminal law imposes liability for negligently causing the death of another
person. The existence of criminal negligence is determined by considering
whether a reasonable person in the defendant's situation would have been
aware of the risk associated with her conduct and acted otherwise. 10 6 If so,
it will not do to argue that instances of negligence are inevitable even in
reasonable persons. For example, if Jake becomes distracted while driving
at the end of a cross-country drive and hits and kills a pedestrian whom he
would have seen and avoided but for his criminal negligence, Jake cannot
avoid liability by showing that he drove exceptionally well the rest of the
trip, pointing out that even good drivers like him occasionally suffer lapses
of attention. Even reasonable people act unreasonably at times, and when
they (we) do, they (we) must pay the price. The yielding to temptation of a
nondisposed person to an excessive temptation is analogous to the rare, but
inevitable, negligent act of even a person who is reasonably attentive and
careful. The only difference is the type of mens rea-intent rather than
mere negligence. Being nondisposed, i.e., reasonably resistant to
temptation, may bar liability, but it does not do so because being
nondisposed implies being nonculpable in a particular instance. As a matter
of morality, a person should not accept any enticement to wrongdoing, even
if a person with a reasonably resistant character would accept.
Accordingly, the Lack of Resources Argument for excusing some prima
facie culpable choices will not fly.
To summarize the argument thus far: Retributivism offers a possible,
but ultimately unpersuasive, justification for the exoneration of those
governmentally entrapped. Though those entrapped rarely cause social
harm, they have committed wrongdoing, at least in the sense they have
acted with the intent to engage in acts believed harmful to the community.
Furthermore, they have acted culpably. Unlike those who have responded
to threats and may invoke the duress defense, they have responded to
105 Both Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel refer to the fact that some aspects of our
character are beyond our control as "constitutive luck." See Bernard Williams, Moral Luck,
in MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 20 (1981); Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in MORTAL
QUESTIONS 28 (1979).
106 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(d), 210.4; LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 15.4.
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circumstances that society was not generally obliged to shield them from
and are owed no dispensation. Furthermore, though they might not be
blamed for failing to develop character qualities to resist offers of the type
needed to qualify for the defense, they may be blamed for failing to resist
the offer itself. Accordingly, if the entrapment defense is to be justified, it
must be so on nonretributivist grounds.
B. ENTRAPMENT AND UTILITARIANISM
This section considers whether the entrapment defense is justified from
a utilitarian perspective. According to utilitarianism, the correct act is the
one that maximizes the good.' °7 The good may be measured in terms of
happiness, pleasure, utility, wealth, or welfare, depending on the brand of
utilitarianism, 0 8 Maximizing social welfare requires considering the costs
and benefits of a course of action. With respect to punishment, reducing
crime is the principal benefit offered. Punishment reduces crimes by
incapacitating, rehabilitating, and deterring those who would commit
crimes, as well as communicating and inculcating norms of appropriate
conduct.'0 9 The costs associated with punishment include the costs of
apprehending, adjudicating and incarcerating those to be punished, as well
as any lost productivity of those punished and the adverse effects on family
and friends. From a utilitarian perspective, then, punishing the entrapped is
justified only if these benefits, as a general matter, outweigh these costs.
Approaching entrapment from a utilitarian perspective is not novel.
Professor Allen, for example, takes a law and economics perspective on the
entrapment defense." 0 Allen focuses on the subjective version of the
defense. For Allen, the central issue to be examined in evaluating the
defense is the meaning of "predisposition." Allen believes that virtually
everybody has some propensity to crime because everybody has a price. If
a person's price is met, his propensity will manifest itself in action."' The
only way to give the term "predisposition" content so that it indicates a
107 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 12-13 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789).
108 See Michael S. Moore, Justifying the Natural Law Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 69 FORD. L. REV. 2087, 2108 (2001).
109 See FREDRICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW
46(1999).
110 See Allen, supra note 61. Law-and-economics is an outgrowth of utilitarianism
applied to legal studies. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed.
1998).
'" Allen, supra note 61, at 413.
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meaningful distinction among those with some propensity to crime, Allen
believes, is to define "predisposition" in terms of a propensity to respond to
a particular price. 1 2 But what should that price be? Allen thinks that
currently prevailing price in the market of criminal behavior is the
appropriate price to use when defining "predisposition" for the purpose of
the entrapment doctrine." 3 The market price of criminal behavior is how
much a person in the real world would have to be paid to commit a crime.
Allen here adopts the economist's expansive view of payments, which can
include emotional as well as financial or psychological gain. The price to
commit the crime of distribution of narcotics may be the street price of the
narcotics, the receipt or peer approval, sexual satisfaction, discharge of a
moral debt, or career advancement."
4
From Allen's perspective, the exoneration of those falling within the
entrapment defense is easily explained. If a nondisposed person commits a
crime, it means that he has accepted an offer that is above the market level.
Accepting such an offer, however, tells nothing about the likelihood that a
person would respond to lesser inducements, such as those at or below the
market level, which the person might realistically encounter." 5 Therefore,
there is no reason to believe that those who are entrapped are in need of
rehabilitation, incapacitation, or deterrence.
1. Utilitarianism and the Problem of the Private Entrapment
Allen's argument for the acquittal of the entrapped applies with equal
force to cases of government and private entrapment. A defendant's
accepting of an above-market criminal solicitation does not indicate a real-
world propensity to crime whether the offer was made to a government
agent or private citizen."16 Allen, however, is not embarrassed by this
implication of his theory. According to Allen, cases of private entrapment
will be highly unlikely. To overpay the market price is, in Allen's view,
tantamount to a charitable donation. 17 In any event, to the extent that
Allen's theory is inconsistent with positive law in recommending the
112 id.
113 See id. at 415 ("The most fruitful criterion of government inducements we have been
able to identify to sort out those who have a plausible claim for exoneration is whether the
inducements exceeded real world market rates .... ).
114 See id. (referring to both "financial and emotional" markets).
' See id. at 415-16. Carlson similarly opines that "if the [defendant's] act was
encouraged by the government its utility as a predictor of danger may reasonably be called
into question." Carlson, supra note 72, at 1071.




acquittal of a privately entrapped person, the theory may be construed as a
normative one recommending the entrapment defense be expanded to shield
even privately entrapped nondisposed individuals.
Allen's account of the entrapment defense is questionable. As
discussed below, government entrapment would result in palpable benefits;
the cost would not be prohibitive.
2. The Benefits of Entrapment and Conviction
Contrary to Allen's claims, there are benefits associated with
convicting the entrapped. The weak point in Allen's analysis of entrapment
is his discussion of deterrence. Theorists distinguish between general
specific deterrence-the deterrence of the punished person who learns the
hard way that crime does not pay-and general deterrence-the deterrence
of the members of the general population who learn the lesson through
observation of examples. Admittedly, little utility is achieved through
deterring a nondisposed person who has been induced to crime on one
occasion. Although engaging in criminal conduct once may undermine a
person's habitual respect for law, being apprehended and charged, or at
least caught in the act, should be an adverse enough experience to reinforce
the norm against law breaking.
Allen, however, undervalues the general deterrence effects of
punishing those who are entrapped, either governmentally or privately.
First, the nondisposed become aware that even their normal level of
resistance to temptation may not be enough to avoid criminal liability.
Although it will be rare that a nondisposed person has occasion to engage in
crime, it does happen. Consider the following case:
Russ is a 46-year-old state trooper who lives with his wife and daughter. While on
duty, he is approached by Lucy, an undercover officer. Lucy is young, attractive,
dressed in cut-off jeans and t-shirt. Eventually, the two start talking about
"partying, "and each admit to getting high. Russ tells her in general terms he has
access to drugs. Over a period of a year, they meet a handful of times, Lucy
requesting Russ obtain drugs for her, and Russ putting her off or telling her where
she can get them herself They kiss on occasion, and present themselves in public
as a couple. Russ develops a romantic interest in Lucy. Russ suggests to Lucy that
she move to his town and that he will pay half of the rent. Lucy continually chides
Russ for not coming through with mnarijuana as he says he will. On one occasion,
in response to her chiding, he buys $10 worth of marijuana which they smoke
together. On a later occasion he offers to obtain more, but does not. Russ is
charged with unlawful delivery of marijuana and criminal conspiracy.118
118 Cf Commonwealth v. Thompson, 484 A.2d 159 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (recounting
similar facts).
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Russ would probably be considered nondisposed and be able to
establish entrapment if Lucy worked for the police.19 Convicting Russ,
regardless whether Lucy worked for the police, would plausibly deter other
older, professional men who might identify with him. Seeing Russ taken to
jail, they might think, "There but for the grace of God go I" and redouble
their conviction not to become involved in drugs (or younger women for
that matter).
Second, cases of governmental entrapment, the core controversial
cases, may have a significant deterrence effect on the predisposed.
Entrapping and convicting a nondisposed individual would send an
enormously powerful message that government is aggressively enforcing a
given prohibition. Consider, for example, the facts of Jacobson v. United
States.20  The defendant had purchased child pornography only after a
lengthy and elaborate undercover government campaign of enticement.
21
If he had been convicted, those disposed to purchase child pornography, as
well as those disposed to produce it, would have reasonably inferred that no
one is safe from being targeted by a government sting operation. The
government's commitment to expending resources to fight child
pornography would be dramatically and memorably demonstrated. Or, as
Seidman has observed, "the few well-publicized cases of Arab sheiks who
turned out to be FBI agents are likely to make members of Congress think
twice before accepting a bribe.' 22 Indeed, the apparent irrationality of
prosecuting even a person who presents little potential threat may attest to
the government's retributivist commitment to punishing crime wherever
and whenever it occurs. 23 The rationality of the government's engaging in
an act which, considered discreetly, appears irrational, has been recognized
in other contexts.
2 4
'19 In fact, in Thompson, see id., the issue of predisposition was not reached by the court
because it applied the objective test. If the question whether Russ was predisposed had been
considered, he likely would not have been found predisposed because of his long record of
failing to deliver despite his promises.
120 503 U.S. 543 (1992).
121 See supra text accompaning note 8.
122 Seidman, supra note 58, at 142.
123 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV.
453, 454 (1997) (recognizing the utilitarian value of retributivist policy in criminal law).
124 See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 18-19 (1960) (applying
considerations of strategic irrationality to nuclear deterrence); see also Larry Alexander &
Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1195 n.9 (1994)




3. The Costs of Convicting the Entrapped
As discussed earlier, utilitarians must consider the costs, as well as the
benefits, of any proposed course of conduct. Conviction of the
governmentally entrapped obviously imposes costs on society, such as court
costs and the cost of incarceration. Many of these costs, however, are no
different from the ones associated with the conviction of the privately
entrapped. These costs are not thought to be prohibitively high, as
demonstrated by the fact that the privately entrapped may not invoke the
entrapment defense. Are there costs unique to cases of government
entrapment which might justify the defense? This section addresses
arguments that there is a significant difference between those privately and
those governmentally entrapped that justifies recognizing the entrapment
defense for the latter.
The Model Penal Code justifies the entrapment defense based on the
costs that government entrapment imposes on society. According to the
Commentaries, probably the most important consideration supporting the
defense is "the injury to the reputation of the law enforcement institutions
that follows the employment of methods shocking to the moral standards of
the community." '125 Since the methods of the police, not the defendant's
subjective mental state, are the focus of the inquiry, the Commentaries
support the objective version of the defense. 2 6 Those entrapped should be
acquitted, the Commentaries imply, not because they have a moral right to
be, but because acquitting them will remove the incentive of police to
engage in conduct that harms their own reputation. If people do not respect
the police, criminality will be fostered in the long run, contrary to the aims
of traditional utilitarianism. The entrapment defense is therefore similar to
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Both are doctrines serving as
prophylactic devices to inhibit future police conduct.
127
The Model Penal Code's theory rests on a number of problematic
assumptions. First is the assumption that entrapment harms the reputation
125 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 6, § 2.13 cmt. at 406. See also
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) ("transcending value at stake" is
"public confidence in the fair and honorable administration of justice") (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
126 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (defense available when a government agent induces a
person to engage in criminal conduct through "methods of persuasion or inducement that
create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those
ready to commit it").
127 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (characterizing exclusionary
rule as judicially created remedy designed to safeguard rights through deterrence, rather than
a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved).
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of the police. The Commentaries state, "In spite of the defendant's moral
guilt in committing the crime, he will enlist much popular sympathy if he
has acted because of shocking police inducement. ' ' 128 This is empirically
doubtful. As the drafters admit elsewhere, the public has never shown great
sympathy for those who are morally guilty.129 This general truth has been
accepted in the context of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment
right against unreasonable searches and seizures is primarily enforced
through the exclusionary rule, 3 ° rather than civil damage actions. The
public, it is thought, would be strongly averse to recognizing the claims of a
criminal and would have much greater sympathies for the police.' 3' In the
context of the Fourth Amendment, the police misconduct is starker because
a legally recognized interest-the interest in privacy-is violated. In
contrast, there is no right, constitutional or statutory, against being
entrapped. It is difficult to think that a substantial segment of the public
would lose respect for the police for apprehending a person who voluntarily
purchased child pornography or dealt in drugs. This is especially true in
those cases under the objective version where the defendant was
predisposed to the crimes. In cases of nondisposed defendants, the most
common reaction, as suggested earlier, would be an increased wariness and
resolve to avoid such situations where one might be entrapped.
In any event, when considering the effects of entrapment on crime
control, the question is not how governmental entrapment would be viewed
by the majority of citizens who have little propensity to commit crime
regardless of their respect or lack of respect for the police, but by those on
the borderline of criminality. That group likely already has little respect for
the police. Compared with police conduct such as brutality and racism
which affects and disaffects them regularly, entrapment of the nondisposed
likely would have little marginal impact on this group's respect for the law.
128 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 6, § 2.13 cmt. at 407.
129 In its discussion of the entrapment defense, the Commentaries explain why the court,
rather than a jury, should determine whether the requirements of defense are met: "(T]he
rights of persons accused are little understood or respected in the community at large. Juries
are apt to give great latitude to the police, at least in relation to an otherwise guilty
defendant." Id. at 418.
130 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
(establishing the inadmissibility of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
131 See Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Truth in Criminal Justice Series,
Report No. 2, Report to the Attorney General on the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule
(1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 573, 627 (1989) (identifying juries' sympathy
with police, not criminals, as a basis of failure to enforce the Fourth amendment through
civil actions).
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This analysis is bolstered by the conduct of the police themselves. It
seems highly implausible that the police would engage in entrapment if it
had the effect of harming their reputation. The police have a strong
incentive and ability to monitor the public's perception of them and a strong
incentive to act in ways to protect their reputation. It can reasonably be
inferred from the existence of entrapment that the police-the group with
the most at stake--do not consider it injurious to their reputation. It is
particularly dubious that the police would engage in entrapment if it led to
greater lawlessness because it undermined the public's respect for law. In
contrast, checks are needed on the types of unlawful searches police engage
in because those clearly prevent crime. The cost to privacy incurred by
unlawful police searches is an externality of the conduct. Cost in terms of
reputation and lawlessness are internalized even without an entrapment
doctrine. Accordingly, these costs do not provide a viable explanation of
the defense.
4. The Net Value of Entrapment
Quantifying the net effects of any proposed rule of law has always
been the bane of utilitarianism. Still, as a broad proposition, it is hard to
doubt that punishing more will deter more. Such an effect is particularly
important in the prevention of so-called victimless crimes, such as narcotics
trafficking and prostitution, where traditional law-enforcement techniques
are less effective. Any convictions, even those of the nondisposed, advance
the cause of general deterrence. Furthermore, the police have an inherent
interest in not expending resources where there will be no net reduction in
crimes. It may therefore be presumed that the police would only engage in
entrapment where they had reason to believe significant deterrence would
result.' 32 From the perspective of utilitarianism, punishing the entrapped is
presumptively defensible.
Admittedly, there may be a segment among the nondisposed who react
as the Model Penal Code Commentaries predict and view the practice of
government entrapment as "unsavory." This would not be surprising given
the prevalence of the entrapment defense. However, a satisfactory theory of
entrapment cannot rest on this public perception. Where a practice is
inappropriate, the public often senses this on an intuitive level. The task of
a theory of entrapment is to articulate a valid basis for this intuition. Thus,
132 See Seidman, supra note 58, at 144 ("[T]o the extent that entrapment doctrine rests on
efficiency grounds, one would expect the police themselves to be motivated to use scarce
resources in a manner that maximizes the number of criminals apprehended.").
[Vol. 94
UNRAVELING UNLAWFUL ENTRAPMENT
the story of the Model Penal Code that governmental entrapment is viewed
by (at least some of) the public as unsavory is likely correct. However, it
cannot be the whole story of entrapment.
C. ENTRAPMENT AND CIVIL RIGHTS
The civil rights theory of entrapment is a prophylactic theory. According to
this theory, there is nothing objectionable in theory about the government's
entrapping a person; in the typical case, entrapment acts as a general
deterrent of would-be criminals at an acceptable cost and in a manner
consistent with desert-based constraints on punishment. Proponents of the
civil rights theory of entrapment, however, assert that entrapment carries the
potential for significant abuse. It has been claimed that "[p]ermitting
conviction of nondisposed persons who have been led astray by police
may... have a chilling effect upon exercise of political freedoms"' 133 and
that "use of agents provocateurs to obtain evidence against individuals by
inducing and participating in criminal acts is a feared tool of government
oppression.' 34 Entrapment, it is charged, might be used against those the
government disagrees with, undermining the basic civil right of
participation in the political process. Furthermore, there is no practical way
to eliminate this possibility of political targeting short of establishing an
entrapment defense applicable to all governmentally entrapped. Thus, the
defense is arguably needed as a prophylactic to eliminate the acceptable risk
of the government's turning political enemies into criminals.
As a theory of the historical basis for the entrapment defense, the civil
rights theory may seem attractive. The entrapment defense is "virtually
unique to the criminal jurisprudence of the United States.' 35 Perhaps its
recognition in the United States is related to this country's unique tradition
of respect for civil rights and protection of the political process. The
framers of the Constitution were clearly concerned about the government's
power to make people into criminals. The purpose of the Bill of Attainder
and the Ex Post Facto clauses was to make sure this power was not
abused. 36  Bills of attainder and ex post facto laws are objectionable
133 Park, supra note 14, at 243; see also MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, supra
note 6, § 2.13 cmt. at 406 (observing entrapment "can easily be employed as the expression
of personal malice on the part of a police officer").
134 Carlson, supra note 72, at 1012. Carlson also opines absent the entrapment defense,
"the government may attempt to induce nearly anyone, exercising easily corruptible
discretion in choosing targets, without respect for the principle of nondiscretionary law
enforcement ...." Id. at 1089.
135 FLETCHER, supra note 12, at 541.
36 See Akhil Reed Ahmar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term Foreword: The Document
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 101 (2000) (noting that singling out known persons
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because they make liability depend on facts-identity and past acts-that a
person has no reasonable chance to avoid. The use of inducements
powerful enough to qualify as entrapment accomplishes the same
objectionable result through executive, as opposed to legislative, action.
The entrapment defense thus might be thought to have grown out of the
same political tradition that produced the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post
Facto clauses.1 37  Furthermore, unlike government entrapment, private
entrapment does not implicate political process concerns. In contrast to
government entrapment, the potential for one group of private citizens to
entrap members of an opposing group is counterbalanced by the latter
group's equal ability. Thus, the civil rights theory of entrapment provides a
solution to the question why government, but not private entrapment, is a
defense.
Two forceful objections may be advanced against the civil rights
theory of entrapment. The first objection is that the potential for abuse of
entrapment is more theoretical rather than practical. There is no record of
entrapment's having been employed as a weapon against those the
government disfavors.'38 Although public figures who are caught in
government sting operations commonly cry that they have been targeted by
their political enemies, such claims rarely have merit. For example, in
ABSCAM, probably the most notorious example of government agents
ensnaring political figures, duped middlemen who volunteered names of
politicians they thought might be open to dealings with "Arab sheiks."'3 9
The targets of the investigation were selected based on this information
for hostile treatment is the obvious concern of the Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder
clauses.).
137 This historical hypothesis, however, is not supported by the case law. The seminal
Supreme Court entrapment cases, see supra note 4, contain not a hint of the theory that
concern for civil rights and political process underlies the entrapment defense. In contrast,
the Supreme Court has given at least passing acknowledgment to the view that the purpose
of the Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy is to ensure the integrity of the political
system. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 751 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting
in connection to challenge to government's recording of telephone numbers that
"individuals, including members of unpopular political organizations or journalists with
confidential sources, may legitimately wish to avoid disclosure of their personal contacts.").
138 See Park, supra note 14, at 237-38 ("Studies of police behavior have turned up
evidence of corruption, brutality, and violations of constitutional rights, but have not found
comparable evidence of entrapment.").
9 See S. REP. No. 97-682, at 16 (1982); see also Irvin B. Nathan, ABSCAM: A Fair and
Effective Method for Fighting Public Corruption, in ABSCAM ETHICS: MORAL ISSUES AND
DECEPTION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 1, 5-9 (Gerald M. Caplan, ed., 1983) (describing
operation of ABSCAM investigation). ABSCAM gets its name from Abdul Enterprises, the
fictitious corporation created by the FBI for its sting operation.
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rather than political affiliation. Former Mayor of Washington, D.C.,
Marion Barry was charged with three felony and ten misdemeanor counts of
violating federal drug laws, and was convicted on one of the latter after he
smoked crack cocaine with a police agent. 40 Although Barry alleged that
he was unfairly targeted by a police investigation, 14' evidence of his
frequent drug use, perjury, and corruption made him an appropriate subject
of investigation. 42  Of course the absence of cases of entrapment for
political purposes may be explained by the existence of the entrapment
defense, which would render such tactics void. However, the existence of a
legal doctrine annulling the effects of police conduct rarely is completely
effective in eliminating the conduct where the police are motivated to
engage in the conduct. This should not be surprising. Where the only
sanction applied to the government is to return it to the status quo ante,
there is no reason for the government not to engage in the conduct based on
the hope that conduct will not be correctly identified and redressed. The
legion of cases identifying violations of the Fourth Amendment despite the
exclusionary rule is ample proof of this theory. Lack of politically-
motivated entrapment cases likely reflects lack of interest in using
entrapment in that manner, as much as the belief that in some cases, the
defense would preclude conviction.
Nor should it be surprising that the government lacks interest in using
entrapment as a political tool. In practice, the government has more
effective ways of oppressing its opponents if it wished to. If convictions
are desired, the government has the simple expedient of planting evidence
and engaging in perjury. Of course in theory, if there were no entrapment
defense, entrapment would have the advantage for the government of
guaranteeing conviction. Evidence planting and perjury may be detected.
Yet entrapment requires a high degree of subtlety and precision. Too weak
an enticement and it Will not be attractive to a nondisposed target; too high
will cause the target to be suspicious. Evidence planting and perjury is a
much more practical alternative and so undermine a prosecution. As the
recent events in Tulia, Texas demonstrate, it is the technique of choice for
obtaining convictions of members of disfavored groups. 143
140 B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Barry Guilty on One Drug Count, Mistrial is Declared on
Felonies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1990, at Al.
4 ' B. Drummond Ayers, Jr., Calling His Conviction Part of a Racist Plot, Barry Starts a
Six-Month Prison Term, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1991, at A]6.
142 See Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Barry Sting, in THE AMERICAN LAWYER 3, 3 (Oct. 1990)
(describing Barry as a person "[a]ny good prosecutor would have wanted to nail").
143 In Tulia, Texas, Thomas Coleman, a lone undercover police officer with little
background in law enforcement, engineered the arrest of forty-six African-Americans on
drug charges, resulting in the thirty-eight convictions with prison sentences ranging from
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Furthermore, the incarceration of political opponents is often an
unnecessary goal for a government seeking to suppress opposition. The
entrapment defense does not create a legal right not to be entrapped.
Rather, it only creates a defense to criminal liability where the police have
exercised their legal power to entrap. The defense therefore removes the
incentive to entrap only from government agents who seek to convict their
enemies. Those in government who wish to suppress opposition, however,
may be able to achieve their goal without the conviction of their target. A
politician's career may easily be destroyed by the publication that he
yielded to a temptation, even if he was not predisposed to so act and even if
it is a temptation that a law-abiding citizen might accept. 144 As argued
earlier, yielding to temptation should be regarded as moral failure, even if it
is a common failure. 145 This point is sharper when applied to public figures
and leaders, who are inevitably held to a higher standard by the average
citizen. Finally, in its bag of dirty tricks, the government has techniques
such as harassment, infiltration, monitoring, and smear campaigns. These
have a proven track-record. 146 With strategies such as these, who needs
entrapment?
twenty to ninety years. In the eleven cases that went to trial, all the defendants were found
guilty based entirely on Coleman's perjured testimony. Lee Hockstader, Texas to Toss Drug
Convictions Against 38 People; Prosecutor Concedes 'Travesty of Justice', WASH. POST,
Apr. 2, 2003, at A3.
144 From 1968 to 1978, thirty-eight percent of United States congressmen charged with
bribery or moral violations failed to be re-elected. John G. Peters & Susan Welch, The
Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections, 74 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 697, 702 (1980). Marion Barry was acquitted of most of the charges based on
his smoking crack cocaine with a government agent. Despite his sucess in court, Barry did
not seek to be re-elected as the mayor of Washington D.C. See Taylor, supra note 137.
145 See supra Parts IlI.A.2.b-c.
146 Martin Luther King, Jr. is perhaps the best-know example of a target of government
initiated smear campaign. Through the use of wire taps, bugs, and informants, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation likely compiled over a million pages on the activities of King and
his associates. The F.B.I. fabricated tapes, disseminated scandalous disinformation,
intimidated supporters, and disrupted fund raising activities. See GERALD D. McKNIGHT,
THE LAST CRUSADE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE FBI, AND THE POOR PEOPLE'S CAMPAIGN
5-6, 26-27 (1998). The F.B.I. also conducted "counterintelligence" activities designed to
destroy the reputations and careers of those suspected of being communists. See KENNETH
O'REILLY, HOOVER AND THE UN-AMERICANS: THE FBI, HUAC, AND THE RED MENACE 200-
14 (1983) (noting that the FBI's COINTELPRO program carried out over 2000 disruptive
actions). For examples of partisan political intelligence gathered by wiretaps and other
means during the Nixon Administration, the reader is referred to the Senate's Intelligence
Activities and the Rights of Americans: Final Report of the Select Committee to Study




Second, it is doubtful that the entrapment defense is needed to guard
against abusive use of persuasive techniques. The Equal Protection Clause
forbids prosecutors from using race or religion as selection criterion when
determining whom to prosecute. 147  Prosecuting a person based on his
opposition to government policies or political views also is
unconstitutional, violating either the First Amendment or the Equal
Protection Clause.148 There is no reason to distinguish the constitutionality
of selective prosecution on one hand and selective investigation/entrapment
on the other. 149 If established, it should constitute a Fourteenth Amendment
violation. Admittedly, it is difficult to satisfy the proof requirements in
analogous cases of selective prosecution.15° It might therefore be argued
that the selective prosecution defense is an insufficient response to the
threat of selective entrapment. The difficulty in establishing the selective
prosecution defense, however, just reflects the considered judgment that,
without a sufficient showing, it is too costly to society to require the
prosecution to respond to charges that the decision to prosecute was
improperly motivated.' 5 ' The entrapment defense is not a reasonable
solution to the problem of improperly motivated targeting of a person
because it permits even those who were not improperly targeted to assert
the claim if there is some evidence the requirements of the defense are
satisfied. A more sensible solution to the problem of improperly motivated
investigation would be to lower the standard of proof in selection. The
entrapment defense, construed as a device to prevent the possibility of
politically motivated entrapment, therefore cannot be justified.
147 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); United States v. Batchelder,
442 U.S. 114, 125 n.9 (1979); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
148 See, e.g., United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074, 1080 (4th Cir. 1972) (permitting
discovery on claim by war protestors that prosecution was intended to inhibit the expression
of viewpoint). See also WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 682 (3d ed. 2000)
(noting that political activity or membership in a political party has been held an
impermissible ground for selection for prosecution).
149 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (racially motivated enforcement
of facially neutral law violates Equal Protection Clause).
15o In Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 458, the Supreme Court considered the claims of Black
defendant indicted for selling cocaine that they were selectively prosecuted based on their
race. Denying their claims, the Court held before being entitled to discovery on the issue, a
defendant must produce credible evidence that similarly situated defendants of other races
could have been prosecuted. Id. at 470. Furthermore, assuming this threshold can be met, in
order to prevail on a selective prosecution claim, defendant must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the prosecution had a discriminatory effect and purpose. Id. at 465.
' See id. at 468 (identifying costs in refuting claim of selective prosecution as diversion
of prosecutorial resources and possible of disclosure of prosecutorial strategy).
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D. ENTRAPMENT AND AUTONOMY
The civil rights theory of entrapment was based on the notion that a
potentially useful tool of law enforcement was fatally flawed by the
possibility of misuse. In contrast, the personal autonomy theory maintains
that entrapment is intrinsically wrong. According to this theory, the core
wrong of entrapment cannot be explained in terms of violating the
traditional limitations retributivism imposes on the government's power to
punish. Instead appeal must be made to a distinct and independent norm:
the principle of personal autonomy. Because entrapment violates this
principle, an entrapped person should not be criminally liable.
Professor Carlson advocates the personal autonomy theory of
entrapment. Carlson believes that entrapment can be understood in light of
the criminal law's act requirement. Common wisdom has it that an "act" is
required for criminal liability."' Carlson agrees with Herbert Packer that
the act requirement protects the "'capacity of the individual human being to
live his life in a reasonable freedom from socially imposed external
constraints' by defining a point of no return beyond which [such] external
constraints may be imposed."",153 In this manner, "[t]he act requirement
shields 'people's thoughts and emotions . . . personality patterns and
character structures' from government scrutiny, and protects personal
autonomy.' 5 4 In other words, requiring an act for liability ensures that
persons will have a safe harbor-thoughts alone and most omissions-
which they may occupy with complete security and freedom from
government interference.
The same respect for personal autonomy, Carlson believes, underlies
the entrapment defense. Carlson writes: "When the government
encourages crime, it directly and prematurely infringes on the realm that the
act requirement is designed to protect from government intervention; the
government uses its power to affect an individual's choices and behavior
before the individual has done anything to warrant an invasion of his
autonomy.' ' 5 5 On this basis, Carlson concludes:
152 See LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 3.2(b). Here, "acts," include breaches of legal duties,
though action or omission, regardless of whether a bodily movement is involved. Id.; but cf
Douglas Husak, Does Criminal Liability Require an Act?, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRIMINAL
LAW: PRINCIPLE AND CRITIQUE 91 (Antony Duff ed., 1998) (challenging common wisdom
that the criminal law contains a nonvacuous act requirement).
153 Carlson, supra note 72, at 1083 (quoting HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 75(1968)).
114 Id. at 1083.
"' Id. at 1084 (footnotes omitted).
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The most objectionable feature of encouragement ... is that the government, by using
encouragement, is no longer in a neutral position vis-A-vis its citizens and the choice
that they make. Rather than giving an individual full freedom to comply with the law,
and thereby respecting the individual's autonomy and ability to avoid crime, by
offering the encouragement the government tries ... to persuade the individual to
violate the law. By manipulating the array of choices facing the individual,
encouragement saps the individual's ability to resist crime and to avoid
punishment.... [Encouragement] circumvents [the act requirement's] restraint on the
state's intrusive powers.15N
Carlson identifies a disquieting aspect to entrapment. The point might
be made by an analogy to a defendant's creating the conditions of his own
defense. As a general principle of criminal law, a defense is unavailable if
the actor has created the conditions necessary for establishing it in order to
avoid liability.' 57 Although this principle is not recognized in its general
form, many defenses include qualifications consistent with this principle.
For example, intoxication may be a defense to certain crimes, but not when
it is self-induced for the purpose of avoiding liability. 58 Likewise, defense
of duress is unavailable when the actor has unreasonably exposed himself to
the situation of duress."5 9 These instances show that the law will not let its
prohibitions be circumvented by strategic conduct by a defendant who has
created the condition of his own defense. In this light, entrapment might be
characterized as the government's creating the conditions of the defendant's
liability. Rather than waiting for the person to autonomously breach the
rules, the government acts strategically in violation of established
limitations of personal autonomy. As Carlson writes: "[E]ncouragement is
clearly intended to circumvent, not honor, the act requirement's core
principle that a criminal sanction will be imposed only in response to past
criminal behavior.',
60
The critical issue in evaluating Carlson's personal autonomy theory of
the entrapment defense is whether entrapment is an illegitimate
impingement upon autonomy and individual freedom. There is, of course,
no general right to be free of government influence until the point where
one commits a criminal act. Arguably the primary purpose of the criminal
law is to establish an incentive system to strongly influence the choices
people make and to guide their conduct. Deterring a person from an
immoral act is surely a legitimate interference with an individual's decision-
156 Id. at 1086-87 (footnote omitted).
157 See Paul Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in the
Linits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1(1985).
'58 See LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 9.5(g) at 480-81; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (1962).
159 See LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 9.7(b) nn. 39-40; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(2).
160 Carlson, supra note 72, at 1053.
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making. Furthermore, the government may sometimes encourage people to
engage in conduct that it believes is not in their objective interest. The
government may encourage people to spend their limited resources on
lottery tickets or to enlist in the armed forces where they risk death on the
battle field. More to the point, the government may take measures that push
people toward crime. The government may incarcerate a person knowing
that his exposure to other criminals will increase the chance of his
recidivism,16' or adopt economic policies that predictably increase the
unemployment rate, reducing people to poverty that "drives" them into
crime. The government may even directly offer strong incentives to engage
in a specific criminal act to those who are predisposed (under the subjective
version of entrapment) or, at least, lesser incentives (under the objective
version) to criminal conduct. These measures are permissible, even though
the government is very often not, in Carlson's language, in "neutral position
vis-a-vis its citizens and the choice that they make." In these cases, the
government typically hopes the bait will be taken. Acceptable practices,
therefore display this "most objectionable feature."
Given that some impingement upon personal autonomy is acceptable,
the question is whether it is plausible to assert that entrapment should be a
defense because of the degree of interference. Is the line that separates
permissible from impermissible impingements from the perspective of
personal autonomy roughly the line between entrapment and inducements
not amounting to entrapment? It is difficult to answer this question because
Carlson's discussion sheds little light on the line between permissible and
impermissible impingements on personal autonomy. One obvious place to
draw the line with respect to governmental influence of decision-making is
at the point where the actor's decision to engage in crime ceases to be
autonomous-where the actor is not to blame for the decision. The
government's brainwashing of a person to commit a crime would
undoubtedly be an improper interference with autonomy, justifying
exoneration to deter future brainwashing. As argued previously, however, a
person who is entrapped is still fully culpable for his conduct.16  Being
enticed to crime by an appealing offer is not analogous to brainwashing
precisely because we believe a person should be able to resist such
pressures. This culpability implies that decision to engage in criminal
161 See Joan Petersilia, et al., Prison Versus Probation in California-Implications for
Crime and Offender Recidivism, 150 PRACTICING L. INST. 105 (1989) (1,022-person study
prepared for the Department of Justice indicating that, compared to probation, imprisonment
increases the rate of recidivism among felons).
162 See supra Part II.A.2.
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conduct in light of the inducement was autonomous. Contrary to Carlson's
claim, even entrapped persons have "full freedom to comply with the
law." Given culpability, there is little room to argue that an entrapped
person's autonomy was improperly interfered with.
Finally, Carlson's theory only offers a partial solution to the problem
of why the entrapment defense does not apply to cases of private
entrapment. An explanation might begin with the following reasonable
point: recognizing the defense when a government agent engages in what
amounts to improper interference is justified because the defense eliminates
the incentive to interfere; in contrast, because few private persons who
convince others to engage in crime do it so that the other may be arrested
and convicted, recognizing the defense in cases of private entrapment
would have no deterrent effect on private entrappers. Nevertheless, if
private entrapment, like government entrapment, constituted an improper
interference with a person's decision-making (that is, a wrong to the person
entrapped), one would expect either criminal liability over and above
accomplice liability or civil liability in the form of a tort claim in order to
deter such private activity. Neither exists. There is neither a crime nor tort
of entrapping (over and above accomplice liability). Without further
elaboration, Carlson's theory does not account for the government actor
aspect of the entrapment defense.
IV. ENTRAPMENT AS UNFAIRNESS
This section of the Article presents a new theory of entrapment. Like
the civil rights theory and the personal autonomy theory of the previous
section, the theory of this section asserts that punishment is not necessarily
justified if it merely satisfies the requirements of traditional utilitarianism
and retributivism. Rather, according to this theory, in addition to meeting
these requirements, punishment must be imposed fairly-a condition
elaborated and applied to entrapment below.
A. UNFAIRNESS EXPLAINED
As a conceptual matter, justice is a principle for guiding, or a standard
for assessing, for the conduct of persons or institutions. It has been
described as the first goal of social institutions. 163 Justice purports to trump,
or at least constrain, the government's pursuit of other ends, such as
163 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (1971); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at
358 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) ("Justice is the end of
government. It is the end of civil society.").
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advancing the general welfare. 164 Despite its significance, justice is not a
unitary concept. Norms of corrective and commutative justice, for
example, are based on different intuitions about what is morally appropriate
and apply in different, although sometimes overlapping, contexts. 165 Justice
has many branches, or aspects.
In the context of the criminal law, justice is usually thought of in terms
of retributive justice. 166  Although there are many conceptions of
retributivism, they all justify harsh treatment of an actor as an intrinsically
morally appropriate or permissible response to actor's wrongful conduct
toward his victim. 167  For punishment to be just, there must be the
appropriate relation between the person to be punished and the actual or
potential victim. For this reason, retributive justice might fall within the
general category of "interactive justice. 168 Some theorists also assert that
the concept of punishment involves a third entity: an authority to establish
the rules and to exact the punishment. 169 With respect to criminal justice,
that entity would be the government. In any case, whether retributive
justice is thought of as involving a two-place relation of wrongdoer and
victim, or a three-place relation among wrongdoer, victim and government,
164 See RAWLS, supra note 163, at 3-4; MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS
OF JUSTICE 3, 14 (1982).
165 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 80 (1996)
(describing corrective justice as responding to disturbances of initially just distributions and
commutative as responding to inequality that might result in exchanging goods). The basic
categories of justice can be traced back to the works of Aristotle. See Aristotle,
Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. V, chs. 2-5 (Richard McKeon
ed., Sir W. David Ross trans. 1941).
166 See. e.g., MOORE, supra note 69, Part I (arguing criminal law best understood as
embodying retributive justice norm); Dolinko, supra note 68 (claiming that retributivism
"has enjoyed in recent years so vigorous a revival that it can fairly be regarded today as the
leading philosophical justification of the institution of criminal punishment").
167 Some offenses, such as prostitution, are sometimes described as "victimless." Upon
further inspection, however, victimless crimes are thought to actually or potentially interfere
will an interest of society, such has the interest in public morals or health and safety. It is
difficult to imagine an actual offense that cannot be justified along these lines. Furthermore,
social interests may be analyzed in terms of the interests of the person, actual or future, that
comprise society. See generally JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
(1984) (following John Stuart Mill in asserting that criminal prohibitions are justified only
insofar as they protect legitimate interests of others).
168 See Richard W. Wright, The Principles of Justice, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1859,
1883 (2000) (dividing forms ofjustice into "interactive" and "distributive").




retributive justice focuses narrowly on a relatively limited number of
entities as they interact on a particular occasion.
In contrast, distributive justice has a much wider focus. Distributive
justice relates to how benefits and burdens attendant to membership or
participation in a collective group, such as a community or nation, should
be allocated across that group. 70 An example of a theory of distributive
justice is Rawls'.s difference principle. According to this principle, a social
system will be deemed just to the extent its institutions maximize the
welfare of the least well-off members of society, that is, raises the tail end
of the wealth distribution curve.'17  This principle is a principle of
distributive justice because what one person is due under it is in part a
function of what others are due under it. Whether it is distributively just to
levy a tax on the wealthy or to grant the wealthy a tax cut depends on the
effect of the levy or cut on the poor. In contrast, the principle that social
institutions should impose burdens that reflect the wrongful conduct of each
member of the society would be a principle that sounds in retributive
justice. Burdens for every person are defined independently. Tort claims
have been evaluated against principles of distributive justice. 7 2  With
limited exceptions, 17 however, considerations of distributive justice have
not been thought relevant in the context of criminal justice. Fairness, as
explained below, is an aspect of distributive justice.
The meaning of fairness is not well-settled. It is a term acknowledged
to have many senses. 7 4 Legal doctrines of fair use, fair play, fair warning,
and fair dealing, for example, all rest on slightly different sets of policy
170 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 166-67 (1980).
... See RAWLS, supra note 163, at 75-80.
172 See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 350-54 (1992) (justifying corrective
aspects of tort law in part as preserving second-best distributions of resources); Alan L.
Calnan, Distributive and Corrective Justice Issues in Contemporary Tobacco Litigation, 27
Sw. U. L. REv. 577, 613-22, 633-41 (1998) (considering whether regulatory controls and tort
actions against tobacco companies were consistent with resource allocations based on risk
and need); see also FINNIS, supra note 170, at 180-81 (discussing distributive justice norms
in personal injury litigation).
173 See Alon Harel & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Hate and Equality, 109 YALE L.J. 507,
509 (1999) (arguing that bias crimes unfairly distribute cost of crime occurrence on
minorities); Sherry F. Colb, Crying Murder When A Woman Refuses a C-Section: The
Disturbing Implications of a Utah Prosecution, FindLaw's Legal Commentary, at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20040316.html (Mar. 16, 2004) (arguing that traditional
duty-to-aid rules, if applied to women carrying fetuses, unfairly burden women).
174 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961, 1004 n.84 (2001) (noting "fairness has many different meanings, some of which stand
apart from, and are opposed to, individuals' well-being"); Philip Giordano, Invoking Law as
a Basis for Identity in Cyberspace, 1998 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 1, 69 (1998) ("'Fairness' has
many meanings in the real world.").
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concerns and moral considerations. Because it has no rigid definition, it is
not unfair to press "fairness" into service again. For the purpose of this
Article, "fairness" shall be defined by reference to the following principle:
Fairness Principle
A government practice imposing burdens in order to achieve a general social good
is fair only if the burdens are imposed pursuant to a policy to allocate such burdens
generally among those expected to benefit from the practice.
A government practice is unfair, and hence presumptively improper, if
it violates this principle.1 75  The principle here is stated with a degree of
abstractness to permit different conceptions of what allocation policies are
fair. For example, under one conception of fairness, fairness would require
highways-a general social good-to be paid for by a fixed tax on all
drivers; under another conception, by tolls, a method that would result in
some drivers paying more than others. The fairness principle is obviously a
matter of distributive justice because it concerns the assigning of burdens
associated with the advancement of the common good. The burden
shouldered by one person will be in part a function of the burden
shouldered by others.
The notion of fairness defined above should have an air of familiarity
to it. Fairness is the principle that underlies much of the Takings Clause
jurisprudence. The Takings Clause forbids the government from taking
private property for public use unless just compensation is paid. Thus, for
example, absent payment, the government may not simply seize the
property of a single landowner and convert that property into a public park.
A court might explain that one person should not have to bear the burden of
providing a benefit to be enjoyed by all. 176 Rather than singling out one
person to bear the entire burden, the government could have caused the
175 The "presumptively" qualifier is added to allow for the operation of competing moral
principles. An unfair practice might be acceptable if, for example, it was necessary to avoid
cataclysmic consequences. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
176 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (stating that one of the
principal purposes of the Takings Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole."); see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 n.4 (1987)
(noting that if the plaintiffs "were being singled out to bear the burden of California's
attempt to remedy these problems ... the State's action, even if otherwise valid, might
violate . . . the incorporated Takings Clause ..."); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 605 (2d ed. 1988) ("[T]he just compensation requirement [of the
Takings Clause] appears to express a limit on government's power to isolate particular
individuals for sacrifice to the general good.").
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burden to be shared more widely through a tax increase to pay
compensation to the evicted landowner. Accordingly, under the
terminology of this Article, the government's appropriation of the property
without compensation would be regarded as unfair. Likewise, regulatory
restrictions not consistent with fairness seem objectionable. If the
government were to require owners of only Fords to equip their cars with
special pollution control devices, Ford owners could legitimately complain
that the cost of improved air quality was unfairly, hence improperly, being
placed on their shoulders. Bills of Attainder, which imposed criminal
sanctions on specifically identified individuals, are prohibited by the
Constitution.' 77  A Bill of Attainder would be paradigmatically unfair
because the burden it imposes is not generally allocated under any
interpretation of "fairness."
1 7 1
B. ENTRAPMENT AND UNFAIRNESS
The principle of fairness readily applies to matters of crime prevention.
To take a well-known example, even facing an unsolved series of high-
profile crimes, the government should not frame an innocent person. Such
an action might be justified on utilitarian grounds because it would
convince would-be criminals of the effectiveness of the police, dissipate
public anxiety, and deter vigilantism. 179 The result has traditionally been
explained on the ground that framing an innocent person offends retributive
justice. 180 The impropriety of framing an innocent person, however, may
also be explained by reference to the principle of fairness. "Why," the
framed person might ask, "should I be the one selected to be framed? I am
just one of the much larger group of persons who have no culpable
connection to the crime. Why has the burden been placed on my
17" U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3, § 10, cl. 1.
178 See Akhil Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV.
203, 221 (1996) (noting that bills of attainder offend, inter alia, rule of law notions of
generality).
179 It has been disputed whether utilitarianism would justify the framing of a innocent
person in the real world. See, e.g., Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed:
Utilitarianism and the Punishment of the Innocent 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115, 132-46 (2000);
John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 44 PHIL. REV. 3, 11-12 (1955). Nevertheless, there is
no doubt that as a conceptual matter utilitarianism might justify such action.
180 See H.J. McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment, 9 INQUIRY 249
(1965); H.J. McCloskey, An Examination of Restricted Utilitarianism, 66 PHIL. REV. 466
(1957). Retributivism requires the appropriate relation between subject of punishment and
an actual or potential victim in order for punishment to be justified. The punishment of a
person who has been framed by the government would be considered unjust because the
requisite causal or culpable relation between the defendant and the victim is absent. See
supra text accompanying note 71.
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shoulders?" The moral arbitrariness of the police's swooping down on an
innocent person and stigmatizing him as a criminal is a second reason why
the practice is so intuitively disagreeable.
Furthermore, there are intuitively objectionable matters relating to
crime prevention that cannot be explained by appeal to retributive justice.
Consider a case where all police activities are funded by a special tax. If
the local government arbitrarily selected a single member of the community
and imposed the entire tax burden on him, this action would not offend
principles of retributive justice. Imposing the disproportionate tax would
not be a matter of punishment without culpability, and contrary to
retributivism, because it would not be a matter of punishment in the first
place. Punishment typically, perhaps inherently, involves stigmatization or
condemnation. 18' Although it is disagreeable to be taxed, it is neither
stigmatizing nor condemnatory. Culpability, which is a requisite for
punishment, is not a requirement for taxation. Yet such a tax would violate
the fairness principle. A tax to fund the police is most appropriately levied
on the community as a whole because all in the community potentially
benefit from the protection provided by the police.182 Although the need to
raise the tax revenue may be great, there is no reason why the burden could
not be spread more generally through an increase in income or sales taxes.
To impose the whole tax on one person would be to make him shoulder a
disproportionate part of the burden of subsidizing police activities and make
him the target of arbitrary government action. The same analysis would
apply if the government seized one person's house and converted it to the
local police station without paying just compensation to the house owner.
This would be a clear violation of the Takings Clause.
The analysis of entrapment from the perspective of fairness flows
quickly from these examples. Expressed baldly, entrapment is analogous to
the random selection of a person to be taxed to support police activities or
the appropriation of a person's home to serve as a police station. The
analogy has four aspects to it. First, entrapping a person produces a social
benefit enjoyed by all-increased crime prevention. As discussed
181 See JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
RESPONSIBILITY 98 (1970) ("[P]unishment is a conventional device for the expression of
attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, on
the part either of the punishing authority ... or of those 'in whose name' the punishment is
inflicted."); Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397 (1965),
reprinted in DOING AND DESERVING 95, 100-01 (1970).
182 The tax might be applied progressively on the reasonable assumption that progressive
taxation is consistent with distributive justice.
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previously, the entrapping of a person may serve to deter generally those
would-be criminals in doubt of the government's resources, commitment
and capability to root out potential evil. The conviction of an entrapped
person thus advances the general social goal of crime prevention like an
increase in police patrols funded by a disproportionate tax or a better
outfitted police station located in a citizen's former home.
Second, the nature of the burden imposed is similar. Being targeted
for entrapment is not in itself stigmatizing. A person who is entrapped is,
under the subjective version of entrapment, by definition a law-abiding
citizen, or at least, under the objective version, not necessarily a person
ready and willing to commit a crime. Being targeted for entrapment is thus
not akin to being punished. Accordingly, it is not something that requires
culpability. Nevertheless, being targeted for entrapment is potentially
burdensome because of the consequences. It is like being subjected to a tax
or a taking that, while not punitive, is still oppressive. The only difference
is that, rather than money or property, however, it is liberty that is being
unjustly appropriated.
Third, those selected for entrapment are arbitrary members of a larger
group. Often it will just be the play of chance that will cause a person to be
targeted for entrapment. There may be many with attenuated connections to
crime who could be lured into it. It will just be bad luck that a police
informant who has an incentive to entrap happens to know the individual, or
that among the many susceptible individuals known by the informant, he
chooses to pursue one in particular. Likewise, it may be pure coincidence
that an undercover police officer posing as a prostitute approaches one
driver stopped at a stop sign to solicit money for sex rather than another
driver.183 There may be numerous persons who would be willing to buy
$870 worth of food stamps for $140. When one such person is selected to
be induced to crime because he happens to be running an ongoing yard sale,
the selection is essentially arbitrary.' 84 In Jacobson, the Supreme Court
downplayed the defendant's initial ordering of a lawful publication of nude
youths, finding that it only indicated "a generic inclination to act within a
broad range, not all of which is criminal."' 85 Many people have such a
generic inclination. In this light, Jacobson's selection as a target for
encouragement was without justification. As a general matter, because the
entrapment defense typically arises in cases of persons who are not
183 See Ferge v. State, 764 N.E.2d 268, 271-72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (finding entrapment
as a matter of law on similar facts).
184 See People v. Boabley, 493 N.E.2d 369 (II. App. 3d Dist. 1986) (finding entrapment
as a matter of law under similar facts).
185 See Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1541 (1992).
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predisposed to crime,18 6 their selection from the general populace of
nondisposed persons entails arbitrariness.
Fourth, there will usually be more equitable alternatives available for
spreading the burden of increasing deterrence. An increase in general
deterrence can usually be achieved through increasing patrol or other
traditional reactive law enforcement activities. These increased activities
can be funded through general taxation of the population. Thus, rather than
being concentrated on an arbitrarily chosen member of the populace, the
populace as a whole will bear the burden necessary to achieve a generally
lower rate of crime. Alternatively, and perhaps more controversially,
increased deterrence could also be achieved in a second more equitable
way: launching an exponentially more aggressive and wide-spread
campaign of entrapment. In such a hypothetical world, the complete
exoneration of those entrapped would not be justified under the unfairness
theory because the burden would not have been disproportionally imposed.
This conclusion, however, is not tantamount to the approval of entrapment.
Because a wide-spread campaign of entrapment would entail the increased
likelihood of being entrapped, the penalties for the offenses induced could
be decreased proportionately without a net loss deterrence. Those
entrapped, while not being able to claim they were treated unfairly, would
enjoy at least a substantial mitigation of their penalty. A defacto
entrapment defense would exist.
Entrapment as unfairness may be understood in light of the
philosopher Gerald Dworkin's views on entrapment. Dworkin sees in
entrapment a type of conceptual incoherence.1 87 On one hand, the law is a
system of sanctions providing citizens with reasons to obey it; on the other
hand, agents of the government are providing reasons to breach it.
Nevertheless, Dworkin recognizes that:
It is not always incoherent to invite someone to do the very act which one is trying to
get them to avoid doing. Consider a parent trying to teach a child not to touch a stove.
In the case of a particularly recalcitrant child the most effect technique might be to
encourage the child to touch the stove in one's presence. The slight pain now will
teach the child to avoid the greater pain later.
188
Dworkin then remarks:
116 Lack of predisposition is a formal requirement of the subjection version of the
defense, see supra note 16, and a common feature of cases satisfying the objective version.,
see supra text accompanying note 65.
187 See Gerald Dworkin, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: Entrapment and the
Creation of Crime, 4 LAW AND PHIL. 17, 32 (1985).
"8 Id. at 32-33.
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But this is surely not the model being used by the police. They are interested in
deterring others or in punishing guilty people. The end being served is not that of the
person being invited to commit the crime.
Dworkin's claim that entrapment is conceptually incoherent thus
reduces to the point that the end entrapment serves is that of the general
welfare, not the person entrapped. This objection has a Kantian ring to it:
one person is being used for the benefit of others rather than being treated
an end himself.'90 But it is implausible to maintain that one should never be
used for the benefit of others. In any progressive tax system that funds
general services, the wealthy are taxed for the good of the poor. More to
the point, we might imagine a school for recalcitrant children where it is
common that one child is selected and invited to engage in the forbidden
behavior (taunting an aggressive animal, eating too much ice cream,
neglecting to study for an examination) so that a lesson might be learned by
his peers. The practices of such a school would not be more objectionable
than Dworkin's example of the child encouraged to touch the hot stove for
his own benefit. Over time, the burden of being made an example might be
broadly shared by the children of the school. Thus, over the long run, those
who enjoy the benefit of a system would share the costs of it. Despite the
fact that persons are being used as means to an end (at least if every
instance is considered discretely), a school's adopting of such a practice is
not intuitively objectionable.' 9' To the extent that burdens are fairly shared,
using a person for the benefit of others seems acceptable. The problem with
entrapment is exactly that this sharing of burdens does not occur.
In sum, government entrapment defense is offensive because it places
significant burdens on a small, arbitrary segment of the law-abiding public.
This result is inherent in the practice. The segment entrapped must be small
because no society can function if most of its members are incarcerated at
any given point. As discussed earlier, it is conceivable that a society might
9 Id. at 32.
190 IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 429 (Lewis White
Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Company 1959) (describing the categorical imperative as the
requirement "to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as
an end and never as a means only").
191 I do not view it as morally relevant that in Dworkin's example, the "sanction," a
finger bum, is the natural consequence of the act sought to be deterred and, in the case of
entrapment, the sanction is imposed by the authority eliciting the conduct. For a sanction to
be effective a deterrent, it must be understood as an automatic consequence of the prohibited
act, rather than conditioned upon its utility as a sanction. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 18-19 (Harvard University 1960) (discussing precommitment as a
rational strategy in case of conflict); see also Larry Alexander, The Deceptive Nature of
Rules 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1191, 1195 (1994) ("If one wants to be a rational deterrer of others'
threatening acts, one may have to become irrational.").
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widely apply some extremely minor sanctions to individuals who are
entrapped. Such a society would be analogous to the school imagined
above and would be consistent with fairness. But this society would
amount to one with a functional entrapment defense because no significant
penalties would be imposed in cases of entrapment. Furthermore, there
could not be a campaign of entrapment against all potential perpetrators of
an offense, such as cannibalism, where that class is very limited. Seeking
to induce all such potential perpetrators might not be impractical. It would,
however, not constitute entrapment because entrapment generally involves
tempting those who are not predisposed with inducements that would be
likely to persuade the average citizen. 192 A small set of potential offenders
would likely be found predisposed or susceptible to relatively mild
inducements. Accordingly, in any plausible society lacking a functional
entrapment defense, entrapment, as currently employed, will violate the
fairness principle.
C. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
This section of the Article considers possible objections to the
unfairness theory of entrapment. As discussed, entrapment offends the
fairness principle. The general form of the objections to the unfairness
theory of entrapment is that the fairness principle is itself implausible.
According to these objections, intuitively acceptable practices violate it.
Therefore the principle must be rejected, at least in its unqualified form.
1. Unfairness and the Problem of Private Entrapment
This Article began by asking why should the law distinguish
government and private entrapment. Any theory of entrapment that seeks
to explain the existing contours of the defense (as opposed to radically
reforming the defense), should show why convicting the privately
entrapped is acceptable, as well as showing why the convicting of the
governmentally entrapped is not.
The fairness principle, it might be charged, goes too far because under
it, the conviction of privately entrapped persons is unfair, and hence unjust.
Imagine this case:
Susan has no criminal record. She works at a fast food restaurant. She takes
hydrocodone, a pain medication for a physical ailment. Her supervisor knows of
her use. The supervisor claims to have a friend who is very sick and needs the
medication. When Susan offers to give the friend her medication, the supervisor
192 See supra discussion concluding Part II.
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suggests Susan needs the money and she convinces her to accept a payment of
$5.00 per tablet. Susan sells the friend some medication, and after continued
pressuring from her supervisor does it again. She is arrested and charged with
sale of the hydrocodone.
If Susan's supervisor is a police informant and the "friend" a detective,
Susan would likely be able to establish entrapment as a matter of law.
193
Susan could validly complain that she had been treated unfairly. After all,
there are likely many people in like circumstances who are similarly
susceptible to inducements Susan was subjected to. To convict her but not
others would be to place a disproportionate share on the burden of deterring
drug trafficking on her shoulders. Would Susan have a similarly valid
complaint of being treated unfairly if the supervisor and friend were not
government agents? From her perspective of the defendant it "feels" the
same whether he has been entrapped by the government or another citizen.
In both cases, she has been arbitrarily selected from an equally susceptible
group and, as a result, faces a significant loss of freedom.
It is morally significant that, in cases of private entrapment, the
government is not responsible for the arbitrary selection. Rather than
arbitrarily selecting an individual, the government in convicting a privately
entrapped person is merely acting on the general principle that all persons
who have culpably committed wrong should be punished. The fairness
principle, in this respect, is like many common principles of morality and
law that distinguish between:
(1) Acting in an improper manner M which results in a harm H being imposed on
person P, and,
(2) Imposing a harm H on person P as a result of another's acting in an improper
manner M.
The former is prima facie impermissible; the latter permissible.194 For
example, it would be unjust for a landlord to enter P's apartment without
permission, burn the money P was planning on using to pay the rent, and
then evict P for failure to pay rent. However, if a third party destroyed P's
money, the landlord may treat P like any other indigent person and justly
evict P for failure to pay rent. Because the landlord in the latter
193 See Dial v. Florida, 799 So. 2d 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (finding entrapment as
a matter of law under similar facts).
194 Principles such as the one above are described as deontological or, perhaps more
accurately, agent-relative. See Michael Moore, Victims and Retribution, A Reply to
Professor Fletcher, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 65, 70 (1999) (discussing concepts). A common
example is the obligation to keep promises. We are morally obliged to keep the promises we
make. However, we are not obliged to help others keep their promises, nor alleviate the
consequences of promises others have broken. In this way deontological/agent-relative
principles differ from consequentialist/maximizing principles such as utilitarianism.
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hypothetical did not cause P to become indigent, the landlord may abide by
his general practice of evicting those who fail to pay their rent. Under
principles of corrective justice, the landlord is responsible for correcting
only the results of his own wrongdoing, for example, by excusing P from
paying one month's rent. Likewise, to take an example from positive law,
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the government from denying a
person employment based on her race. If a person, however, has suffered
private employment discrimination resulting in her lacking significant job
experience, the government can refuse to hire the person based on her lack
of experience.195 From the perspective of the wronged individual, it feels
the same: objectionable treatment (theft, discrimination) resulting in a
relative disadvantage (eviction, unemployment). The difference is whether
the entity in a position to alleviate the disadvantage or cause an additional
one is the entity responsible for the initial mistreatment. Only where that is
the case can the person validly complain about the entity's action. Because
in cases of private entrapment the government was not responsible for the
arbitrary selection, it may follow its general policy of punishing culpable
wrongdoers.
Taxation provides a particularly germane example. It is unfair and
improper for the government to select a person to be taxed based on a
morally arbitrary characteristic, for example, being seated at the end of a
bar in a local nightclub. However, it is neither unfair nor improper for the
government to impose a tax based on a morally relevant characteristic, such
as net income. This is true even if it is morally arbitrary that a person
happens to possess that characteristic, for example, by winning a large
promotion prize based on a random drawing. Likewise, it is unfair and
improper for the government to target for entrapment the person who
happens to be seated at the end of bar in a local nightclub, while it is
acceptable to prosecute and convict someone who others have arbitrarily
selected, perhaps through location at a nightclub, to have the morally
relevant characteristic of criminal culpability, for example through private
entrapment. The following chart compares the previous three hypotheticals:
195 A plaintiff must show a discriminatory purpose to establish an Equal Protection
claim. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (announcing "the basic equal
protection principle that invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose"). In Davis, the Supreme Court
permitted the use of a police department application test that blacks failed at a
disproportionate rate because of their weak language skills. The fact that this low skill level
was likely the effect of attending substandard segregated schools, and hence, reinforced the






Entity Criterion Entity Burden Moral
Arbitrarily of Imposing Imposed Status of
Selecting Selection Burden Imposing
Burden
Private Party Lottery Government Tax Fair
Number
Private Party Location Government Incarceration Fair
at
Nightclub
Government Location Government Incarceration Unfair
at
Nightclub
As indicated, imposing a disadvantage is only unfair when the entity
imposing it is responsible for the initial arbitrary selection.
2. Fairness and General Law Enforcement Activity
A second possible objection to the fairness theory of entrapment is that
the fairness principle, if valid, would bar much police activity and many
convictions that are both clearly legal and intuitively acceptable.
Consider, for example, the arbitrary decision of the police to patrol one
among many neighborhoods one evening, resulting in the apprehension of a
burglar. Undoubtedly, there are many other burglars equally deserving of
arrest and conviction who are not arrested. Can the apprehended burglar
argue that convicting him would be unfair? After all, although he has not
been personally selected from all other burglars to be apprehended, the
bottom line is the same. Because standard reactive crime detection
practices are not completely effective, he, as one among many situated
burglars, will have to bear a disproportionate burden of advancing general
deterrence. Likewise, consider encouragement of criminal conduct by the
police that does not rise to the level of entrapment. It is well established
that there is no entrapment if a police officer simply approaches a person-
even without probable cause-and offers to buy a quantity of illegal
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narcotics at their street price. 196 Such police conduct, to be distinguished
from inducements powerful enough to support a finding of entrapment, may
be called "opportunity providing." Yet, so goes the objection, would not
convicting the defendant who has seized the opportunity provided for crime
violate the fairness principle? After all, there are undoubtedly many drug
dealers who would have accepted the offer and he has been forced to bear a
burden which should be more fairly distributed.
In response to the objection based on standard reactive crime detection
practices, such as patrolling one among many areas, it may be replied that
these practices do not create a disproportionate burden on those they
apprehend to the extent that entrapment does. The proportion of criminals
who are currently apprehended through standard police practices is
approximately twenty percent.197 In contrast, the proportion of nondisposed
person who are entrapped is vanishingly small. Like most moral principles,
unfairness is a matter of degree. To be entrapped is many times more unfair
than to be apprehended through standard reactive crime detection practices.
A second distinction may be drawn between entrapment and standard
reactive crime detection practices which, as discussed above, fail to spread
the burden of crime control across the population of all criminals. The
fairness principle is a principle of justice. Justice, however, need not be
conceived in absolutist terms as a value carrying infinite weight. With due
deference to Kant, 1" to refuse to commit the slightest injustice in order, say,
to alleviate the suffering of mankind, bespeaks a lack of perspective. While
principles of justice may be reformulated and qualified to preserve their
formal superiority over considerations of welfare, some degree of
accommodation with other values, however that accommodation is
conceptualized, must be admitted. Entrapping and convicting a high
percentage of the population through a widespread campaign of entrapment
196 Under the subjective version of entrapment, if the offer is accepted, the defendant's
predisposition will be established. See State v. Duncan, 330 S.E.2d 481, 487-88 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1985) ("Predisposition may be shown by a defendant's ready compliance, acquiesce in,
or willingness to cooperate in the criminal plan where the police merely afforded the
defendant an opportunity to commit the crime."). Under the objective version, the conduct
of the police would not be found sufficient to induce a law-abiding citizen to sell drugs. See
People v. Crawford, 372 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) ("[M]ere requests to sell
contraband, even repeated request, are not conduct likely, when objectively considered, to
induce the commission of the crime by a person not ready and willing to commit it.").
197 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED
STATES 2001, 220 (2002).
'98 Cf. IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL FIRST PRINCIPLES OF THE DOCTRINE OF RIGHT,
in THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 141 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge University Press
1991) ("[l]fjustice goes, there is no longer any value in men's living on the earth.").
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(without any mitigation of penalties), while eliminating unfairness, is not a
realistic option for society. Likewise, abandoning standard reactive crime
detection practices, such as police patrols, while also eliminating
unfairness, is not a realistic option for society. Such practices are necessary
if crime is to be deterred and society protected. 99 In contrast, entrapment,
although a cost-effective means of preventing crime,200 is not a necessary
means. Other techniques more consistent with the demands of fairness,
including undercover investigation and encouragement not amounting to
entrapment, will suffice to achieve a reasonable level of crime control.
Thus, not only is the injustice of entrapment relatively severe, it is also
relatively lacking in justification.
A third, and perhaps the most important, distinction between
entrapment and other law-enforcement activities, such as opportunity
providing, is that entrapment is a practice that is unfair by design. Both
entrapment and other police enforcement activities distribute burdens
disproportionately to varying degrees. The goal of other forms of police
activity, however, is to be as effective and far-ranging as possible.
Although it may be arbitrary which streets the police choose to patrol, and
so which burglars are arrested, the police would patrol all the streets and
apprehend all burglars if they could. Burglars both deserve to be punished
and their incarceration would prevent them from committing further crimes.
Likewise, while it may be arbitrary which drug dealers are caught by a
police sting operation that provides opportunities for crime, such operations
are designed to apprehend as many drug dealers as possible and it is
regrettable that through such operations not all drug dealers are
apprehended. For this reason, the unfairness of these practices is analogous
to the unjustness of other aspects of the criminal justice system. Persons
who are not liable are sometimes convicted. Although convicting such
persons is unjust, it is merely a regrettable, and not a fatal, feature of the
criminal adjudication system. In contrast, an adjudication system designed
with the purpose of convicting those not liable would be deeply disturbing.
199 Indeed, it could be argued that the Fairness Principle requires that penal sanctions at
the heart of our criminal justice system never be imposed. After all, such sanctions will fall
almost entirely on criminals, while criminals and the innocent alike benefit from the
increased security resulting from operation of the criminal justice system. A partial reply to
this argument is that the innocent, through taxes and self-restraint, bear some of the costs
associated with our criminal justice system. A more complete reply, however, recognizes
that the Fairness principle does not preclude the operation of other principles of justice.
Punishing the innocent would violate norms of retributive justice. The Fairness Principle is
satisfied if among those beneficiaries otherwise eligible to be burdened, the burden is
distributed equally.
200 See supra Parts III.B.2-4.
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The moral distinction between wrongs done by design and those that are
merely unavoidable side effects has a long and respected lineage.20'
Like an adjudication system designed to convict the innocent, the
practice of entrapment breaches the norms of justice by design. Even if it
were possible to entrap widely enough to spread equitably the burden of
conviction among the nondisposed, the state would not want to engage in
such a practice. As discussed, entrapment is justified as a general deterrent.
It is thus inherently a matter of using the few as examples for the many. If
many were to be entrapped through a wide-spread and ongoing campaign of
entrapment, it would demonstrate entrapment's failure to deter, rather than
its success. A program to deter those already incarcerated would make no
sense. The practice of entrapment therefore will be designed to burden the
few among many who would benefit from it, thereby offending the
principle of fairness.
3. Specific Counter-Examples
This section looks at specific police activities that may seem to violate
the fairness principle. The validity of these activities may appear to imply
that the fairness principle is overbroad and should be rejected. This
implication is illusory.
a. Speeding
It is a common practice for the police to stop only a very small
percentage of motorists who drive above the speed limit. General
deterrence is the principal justification of the practice. As with entrapment,
the police do not desire to ticket all speeders. Can those stopped complain
of unfairness?
Two considerations mitigate the prima facie unfairness of the practice.
First, police in fact do not usually swoop down on an arbitrary speeder and
ticket her. Common experience indicates that the great majority of highway
201 This distinction is frequently referred to as the Doctrine of Double Effect, and usually
traced back to Thomas Aquinas. See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Il-I, Q.64,
art. 7 (Marcus Lefebure ed., Blackfriars 1975). A typical example illustrating the operation
of this doctrine is that it is morally permissible to bomb a munitions factory to hasten the end
of a war, even if it is foreseen that civilians will inevitably be killed by errant bombs. It is
not, however, morally permissible to drop bombs on civilians in order to hasten the end of
the war by breaking the morale of the enemy. See Gerald Dworkin, Intention,
Foreseeability, and Responsibility, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS 338,
339 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987); Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and
Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect, 18 PINL. & PUB. AFF., 334, 334 n.3 (1989).
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speeders exceed the speed limit by less than twenty-five percent. These
drivers do not pose a substantial risk because their speed is relatively near
the limit. Furthermore, because a substantial number of drivers drive in this
range, each individual driver, traveling with the pace of traffic generally, is
not increasing the risk nearly as much as if only a few exceeded the speed
limit. In light of these facts, the common practice of patrol officers is to
stop only those who speed "excessively." Their choice is not arbitrary, but
limited to a group, reckless speeders, whom the police would like to
apprehend generally. In contrast, the police would not like to apprehend
generally those persons targeted for entrapment. Second, the penalty
associated with speeding violations is de minimis compared to the penal
sanctions associated with the crimes the entrapment defense normally
applies to. Any unfairness is mitigated proportionately. If the police
randomly pulled over one among many drivers traveling 5-10 miles over
the speed limit on a state highway and, as a result, significant penalties were
imposed, the practice would become intuitively objectionable.
b. Tax Audits
Another example of a "random" law enforcement technique used
primarily for deterrence is tax audits. Tax audits fall within the category of
necessary evils, that is, cases where the practice serves some important
social function and this function cannot be achieved through a means that
spreads the burden more equitably. It is functionally impossible to inspect
carefully the hundreds of millions of tax returns filed each year.
Maintaining compliance with the income tax is an indispensable social goal.
Although most persons undoubtedly now file their proper returns not based
on the fear of being audited, but because of their commitment and belief in
the legitimacy of the taxation scheme, wide-spread cheating would in time
undermine the perceived legitimacy of the scheme. If that tipping point is
ever reached, the income tax would have to be abandoned. Accordingly, in
contrast to entrapment, some disproportional burdening of individuals is
necessary.
c. High-Profile Prosecutions
Finally, the not uncommon prosecutorial practice of targeting high-
profile or celebrity figures is consistent with the fairness principle.
Prosecutors have brought charges against professional athletes, media
personalities, and politicians in cases where they may not have proceeded
2004]
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against members of the general public.202 These decisions may be based on
the notion that, in terms of deterrence, such prosecutions provide "a bigger
bang for the buck." A high-profile defendant might therefore claim that she
has been unfairly targeted, arguing that because other arrestees would not
have been prosecuted, or granted lighter sentences, she is being made to
shoulder a disproportionate burden of the cost of crime prevention. This
argument has an air of plausibility. Prosecutors sometimes deny the
premise that they treat defendants based on their notoriety,0 3 likely
concerned that otherwise the public may perceive them as acting unfairly.
Targeting high-profile figures for prosecution, however, may be analogized
to the progressive income tax. Requiring all who earn a high income to pay
a high tax is arguably consistent with distributive justice because (a) there is
a good reason why those who earn more should pay proportionately more,
e.g., they can afford it, or they have benefited more from society; and (b)
the policy is applied generally across all members of a given high income
bracket. Likewise, targeting high-profile defendants can be justified based
on a greater-deterrence rationale where such a policy is applied consistently
to all high-profile defendants. As noted earlier, the fairness principle, like
any principle of justice, may admit different interpretations consistent with
its broad terms.
20 4
Entrapment, however, may not be defended along these lines. As a
rule, the police do not attempt to entrap all members of a given group, even
202 See Vikram David Amar, The Many Ways to Prove Discrimination, 14 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 171, 178 n.13 (2003) (noting that the Securities and Exchange Commission
uses high-profile prosecutions to ensure more general compliance); Michael A. Simons,
Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecutorial Guidelines, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 954 n.281
(citing cases against sports figures brought because of their deterrence value); see also
Harriet Chiang, Starr Would Find It Difficult To -Prove Perjury by Clinton, S.F. CHRON.,
Sept. 18 1998, at A5 (discussing perjury investigation of Bill Clinton; noting "when
someone is charged solely with perjury, it often involves a high-profile figure"); Mark Helm,
Ex-Prosecutors Say Clinton Held to Tougher Standard; Perjury Convictions Common, GOP
Argues, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.) Dec. 10, 1998, at AI0; Arianna Huffington,
O.J, Bill and the Perjury Plague, N.Y. POST, July 21, 1998, at 25 (arguing to deter perjury
"it is so critical that the nation's two highest-profile alleged perjury cases-those of O.J.
Simpson and Bill Clinton-are pursued to their respective ends"); Erin McClam, Martha
Stewart Guilty ofAll Counts, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS (Tenn.) Mar. 6, 2004, at A I
(describing conviction of Martha Stewart; noting her "supporters claim she was being
targeted because of her celebrity status").
203 See REUTERS, Colo. Prosecutor Mulls Charges Against Kobe Bryant, (July 7, 2003)
("'In deciding whether to file charges, the same standards apply to Mr. Bryant as apply in
every other sexual assault case,' Hurlbert said. 'I will treat this case just like I treat any other
sex assault case."').
204 See supra text accompanying note 99.
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if the group is defined narrowly, in a manner analogous to "high income
persons." Consider the following, not atypical, case of entrapment.
Ken is desperately in need of money. He approaches Rocky, a confidential police
informant, for a loan. Rocky refuses, but convinces Ken, who has no history of
drug use, to join a drug transaction. Ken and Rocky drive to a highway
intersection where they meet Willy, an undercover police officer. Willy gives Ken
$300. Willy and Ken agree to meet later that day to complete the transaction. Ken
reluctantly accepts a bag containing 3 grams of cocaine from Rocky. Rocky, Ken
and Willy later meet in a parking lot. When Ken gives Willy the bag, he is arrested
and charged with dealing in cocaine. On appeal of his conviction, Ken is found
not to befredisposed as a matter of law and exonerated based on the entrapment
defense.
Many people like Ken are in desperate financial straits. Many
undoubtedly could be pressed against their better judgment into playing an
insignificant role in a minor drug transaction. The police have no general
interest in entrapping all such persons. Ken, although having no history of
drug use, admittedly had some contact with unsavory characters such as
Rocky. This much might be inferred from Ken's approaching Rocky for a
loan. Even if Ken's class is defined even more narrowly as "persons in
financial need, short on prudence, and familiar with unsavory characters," it
is doubtful the police were operating according to a practice designed to
entrap most of the members of this class. Rather, they were only trying to
entrap those who had the misfortune of approaching Rocky. It no less
offends justice to entrap only the members of the "class" that happen to
know Rocky than it would be to impose a particularly high tax on those
with high incomes who happened to know Rocky. Thus, the prima facie
validity of various law enforcement practices does not undermine the
fairness principle as an explanation for the unjustness of entrapment.
D. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS
A theory of entrapment should explain the major contours of the
defense, such as the distinction between governmental and private
entrapment. The preceding sections have attempted to meet that goal. A
theory of entrapment ideally should also be able to recommend solutions to
open doctrinal issues. That is the work of this section.
1. Subjective v. Objective Theories
An open issue in the area of entrapment is the dispute between the
subjective and objective versions of the defense. As argued earlier, most




cases actually brought will come out the same way under either version.
For this reason, it was methodologically acceptable to formulate a theory of
entrapment without reference to the distinction between the versions.
Nevertheless, having developed and defended the entrapment as unfairness
theory, it is appropriate to inquire which version of the defense is more
consistent with it.
The inquiry should focus on those rare cases where the subjective and
objective versions produce different outcomes. These may be referred to as
cases of the objectively entrapped predisposed defendant. For example:
Larry is a professional pickpocket. He owes $100 dollars to a bookie and must
pay the debt the next day. Broke, he leaves his home late one evening to go to a
crowded bus terminal to ply his trade. Larry has frequently been successful at the
terminal, but on a number of occasions, he has been arrested. Just outside of the
terminal, Larry sees a man lying on his side in a fetal position with a paper bag
containing a beer bottle in one hand. The man is a police officer feigning
drunkenness as part of a decoy operation. A wallet protrudes from the rear pocket
of his jeans. Bills sticking out of the wallet can be easily seen. Larry walks by the
apparently helpless drunkard. He then turns back and steals the wallet. Two
officers witnessing the theft spring from cover and apprehend hint. Larry is
charged with theft.
If these events occurred in a jurisdiction following the subjective
version of the entrapment defense, Larry would be out of luck. While he
might be able to establish that he was induced to commit the theft, the
government likely would be able to carry its burden of proving that Larry
was predisposed. Larry needs money immediately. He has a criminal
record of engaging in similar crimes at the same location. Larry did not
hesitate in taking the wallet. In contrast, if these events occurred in a
jurisdiction following the objective version of the entrapment defense,
Larry would likely be able to avoid conviction. Courts have held on similar
facts that, as a matter of law, the drunk decoy operation created a
substantial risk that theft would be committed by persons other than those
ready to commit it, thereby satisfying the requirements of the objective
test.20 7  On these facts, does the fairness principle permit conviction
consistent with the objective version or require exoneration consistent with
the subjective version?
206 See supra Part II.C..
207 See Hawaii v. Powell, 726 P.2d 266 (Haw. 1986); see also Cruz v. Florida, 465 So. 2d
516 (Fla. 1985) (use of drunk decoy satisfies objective test as matter of law); Sheriff,
Washoe County v. Hawkins, 752 P.2d 769 (Nev. 1988) (same). But see People v. Walker,
615 P.2d 57 (Colo. App. 1980) (rejecting entrapment defense on similar facts).
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Arguments based on the fairness principle may be advanced in support
of either resolution. On one hand, Larry can claim he has been treated
unfairly because he has been subjected to an unfair police practice. Using
decoys is unfair because it typically results in the apprehension of an
arbitrary member of a large, generally law-abiding class that the police have
no wish or intent to prosecute generally. On the other hand, the government
can argue that it is fair to convict Larry because it would, if it could, convict
all similarly predisposed pickpockets. The dilemma here is one
manifestation of the general problem of how the law should treat parties,
such as the police, who have acted in a manner that is objectionable in
theory, but which, due to unforeseen circumstances, results in an otherwise
acceptable outcome, such as the apprehension of a predisposed
defendant.0 8
A reasonably close analogy is presented by "after-acquired evidence"
cases that arise in the employment law context. In the typical after-acquired
evidence case, a member of a minority group is fired from a job and sues.
In the course of litigation, the plaintiff is able to establish that he was fired
based on unlawful discriminatory grounds, but evidence is also discovered
that shows that he committed predischarge conduct that would have
justified his firing in the first place. The minority member can claim he was
subjected to an unfair practice (discriminatory discharge) and the employer
can claim that the firing of an employee who engaged in misconduct is not
unfair. Courts have resolved after-acquired evidence cases, holding that the
employer may proceed in the light of the newly acquired evidence to deny
reinstatement and deny damages from the point where the evidence was
acquired.20 9 Any other conclusion would be "inequitable. 210
There seems no reason why the dispute concerning the objectively
entrapped predisposed defendants should be resolved differently than one
concerning wayward employees who have suffered discrimination.
208 This problem also arises in the context of persons who engage in conduct prohibited
according to an offense definition, unaware that they are doing so under circumstances that
would uncontroversially establish a justification defense if they were aware of them. Known
as the problem of "unknowing justification," this issue has attracted the attention of a
number of criminal law theorists, including the Author. See, e.g., Russell L. Christopher,
Unknowing Justification and the Logical Necessity of the Dadson Principle in Self-Defense,
15 OXFORD J. LEG. STUDIES 229 (1995); Anthony M. Dillof, Unraveling Unknowing
Justification, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1547 (2002); Paul Robinson, Competing Theories of
Justification: Deeds v. Reasons, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 45 (A.P. Simester and A.T.H.
Smith, Clarendon Press 1996); Robert F. Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just
Convictions, 24 PAC. L.J. 1233, 1267-82 (1993).




Applying this principle to entrapment, the predisposed defendant should be
convicted despite the fact that he happened to be ensnared in a practice
which, as a general matter, produces unfair results.21' It is not unfair to
convict persons like Larry because the government would, if it could,
convict all the members of his class (predisposed pickpockets). The
government, we might say, is not acting unfairly to him in prosecuting.
This point may be more clear if we imagine the less likely scenario that the
government is aware that Larry is on his way to the bus terminal to pick a
pocket, but for various reasons decides it would be preferable to catch Larry
through the use of a decoy that might ensnare even a generally law-abiding
citizen. Such a tactic, it is submitted, is not intuitively objectionable.
The case for the subjective version of entrapment, however, is not
open and shut. A prophylactic argument can be made for the objective
version of the defense. Under the subjective version, a defendant must be
acquitted unless it can be demonstrated that he was predisposed. It might
be thought that juries will be overly eager to find predisposition in the face
of actual criminal conduct and so fail to acquit a nondisposed person
pursuant to the entrapment defense. The objective version of the defense
would eliminate such instances of erroneous conviction. If the number of
these erroneous convictions is expected to be greater than the relatively few
number of cases where the objective and subjective versions diverge, these
convictions can be eliminated at a relatively low cost. The adoption of the
objective version of entrapment, though overbroad, would then be
defensible.
2. Positional Predisposition
A second doctrinal conflict lies within the ranks of adherents to the
subjective version of entrapment. Courts in subjective jurisdictions are split
on the meaning of "predisposition." Generally speaking, under the
subjective approach, where a defendant has been induced to commit a
crime, he is entitled to an entrapment defense unless the government can
establish that he was predisposed to commit the offense. But exactly what
21 1 Design aside, in cases of objectively entrapped predisposed defendants, the
disproportionality of the burden is not as great as in the cases of nondisposed defendants.
First, there are many more nondisposed to crime than predisposed. Second, among this
larger group, there are many fewer who potentially bear the burden of conviction. Among
the nondisposed, this lesser group is only those who have been exposed to usually high
inducements. In contrast, many of the predisposed will commit crimes and be apprehended,
either as a result of inducements not rising to entrapment or through the usual mechanism of
police apprehension after commission of the crime. Consequently, the relative percentage of
nondisposed potentially burdened by entrapment is much less than that of the predisposed.
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is it to be predisposed? The Ninth Circuit has concluded that a
"predisposition" refers to a mental state or a characterological propensity,
roughly equal to being ready to commit the crime should an opportunity
present itself.212 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge
Posner, and the Fifth Circuit, have taken the position that "predisposition"
includes a positional component.213  Under this interpretation of
predisposition, a defendant would only be predisposed if, absent
government involvement, he both was ready and willing to commit the
crime (the mental component) and was so positioned that he would likely
have committed it (the positional component).
An example offered by Judge Posner nicely illustrates the added
requirement of the positional interpretation. Posner writes:
Suppose the government went to someone and asked him whether he would like to
make money as a counterfeiter, and the reply was, "Sure, but I don't know anything
about counterfeiting." Suppose the government then bought him a printer, paper, and
ink, showed him how to make the counterfeit money, hired a staff for him, and got
everything set up so that all he had to do was press a button to print the money; and
then offered him $10,000 for some quantity of counterfeit bills.
The individual approached by the government clearly possessed the mental
state sufficient to be found predisposed; when presented with the
opportunity, he seized it with little prompting. The individual, however,
was not positionally predisposed because, absent the involvement of a
government agent, it is doubtful he ever would have been in a position to
move from his desire to counterfeit to actual counterfeiting. In light of this
fact, should the individual be considered "predisposed" for the purpose of
the subjective version of the entrapment defense? The Supreme Court has
yet to address the issue. 15
212 See United States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
213 See United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Knox, 112 F.3d 802, 808 (5th Cir. 1997) (agreeing with Hollingsworth).
214 Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1199.
215 In United States v. Jacobson, 503 U.S. 540 (1992), the Court's most recent
entrapment case, the Court stated that "[w]hen the Government's quest for conviction leads
to the apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely
would never have run afoul of the law, the courts should intervene." Id. at 553-54. Literally
construed, this statement is broad enough to admit a positional component. The facts of
Jacobson, however, do not require such an interpretation. The court concluded that
Jacobson was not predisposed. There was no showing, however, that child pornography was
otherwise unavailable over the Internet or otherwise. Rather, the Court emphasized the
government's role in piquing and legitimating Jacobson's interest in child pornography-
implying that Jacobs lacked the mental component of predisposition. Furthermore, language
in older Supreme Court opinions stresses that the purpose of the entrapment defense is to
protect the "unwary innocent." See United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932). This
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The fairness theory of entrapment would support the requirement of a
positional component to predisposition. It would thus favor extending the
defense to those who would likely never have been in a position to have
committed the charged offense absent the government's providing that
opportunity even if they were otherwise willing to commit the offense.
Under the fairness theory, willingness to commit an offense is not, in itself,
a decisive factor permitting entrapment and conviction. Many "law-
abiding" people, under the appropriate circumstances, might be willing to
commit a crime, particularly one without an identifiable victim. It is fair to
speculate that many people, for example, might trade on insider information
if they believed the chances of detection were minimal and the financial
gain realized, or loss to be avoided, was sizable. For the government to
arbitrarily select and entrap one among many such persons would be unfair.
Rather, under the fairness theory, the critical factor is the likelihood, all
things considered, that the person would commit the offense. If a person is
likely to commit a crime, then entrapping and convicting those like him to
protect the public is a course of action the government would like to engage
in generally. Although the government in fact may not be able to do so, this
limitation no more renders the practice unacceptable than other social
institutions which in practice fail to consistently achieve the ideals they
were designed to achieve.21 6
A similar analysis applies to the question whether a person should be
considered predisposed if he has a substantial desire or inclination to
engage in the criminal conduct at issue, but that desire or inclination is kept
in check by a stronger appositional one. For example, imagine Frank, a
person who has always dreamed of being a counterfeiter, and has access to
all the necessary equipment. Frank, however, also has an overriding fear of
being apprehended for counterfeiting. Accordingly, Frank foregoes the
opportunity to counterfeit until he is approached by undercover agents who
convince him that he can proceed without detection. Should we say that
Frank was predisposed and thus not entitled to the entrapment defense?
217
The fairness theory would reject this result. From the perspective of
fairness, Frank is in the same position as the individual in Posner's
language is inconsistent with the positional interpretation. It is difficult to describe persons
who desire to commit crimes, such as the individual in Posner's hypothetical, as innocent.
216 See supra text accompanying note 193.
217 This issue is raised in Jacobson v. United States, where the dissent argued that the
Court's finding that Jacobson had a predisposition to view photographs of preteen sex




hypothetical. While both have a desire to engage in crime, without
government involvement it is unlikely that either would have. The
government is not interested in apprehending all of those held in check
based on fear of apprehension or other defeasible psychological constraints
on criminal desires. Even though he has a desire to be a counterfeiter, it is
unfair to make him the target of a practice that is designed to use the few for
the benefit of the many.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The norms of justice constrain governmental efforts to advance the
common good. Retributive justice requires that an actor be morally
culpable for causing or risking harm to another before the state may
disadvantage the actor in a significant and stigmatizing way. Distributive
justice requires that the benefit and burdens of the joint enterprise of society
be appropriately shared among its members. This Article has urged that the
domains of these two sets of norms are not mutually exclusive, one
beginning where the other leaves off. Rather they may overlap in various
contexts, operating in a simultaneous and complementary fashion to restrain
the state.
Case in point is entrapment. In order to justly punish persons who
hav been entrapped, it must be that they are culpable for their unlawful
acts. This Article has argued that they are, even in cases where they have
faced temptations that even a reasonable person might yield to. There is no
excuse for freely choosing to do wrong. Even though reasonable persons
cannot be blamed for their limited resistance to temptation, they can be
blamed when those limits are exceeded and wrongdoing results. Rather
than foundering on norms of retributive justice, entrapment founders on the
norms of distributive justice. Most persons entrapped within the legal
definition of entrapment are nondisposed to crime, and so are not dangerous
enough to justify entrapping pursuant to a general practice. From a
utilitarian perspective, entrapment is justified not because it incapacitates,
but because it can deter generally. Deterrence however is inherently a
matter of using few for the benefit of the many who might otherwise be
victims of crimes or subjects of criminal sanctions. Entrapping the many
would make no sense. Thus, entrapment, as a practice, is designed to
disadvantage only a limited number of the population who are similarly
situated with respect to dangerousness, deterrent value, and other relevant
features. In this respect, entrapment is similar to the conversion of an
arbitrarily selected person's home to a police station for the benefit of the
community as a whole. The goal of crime prevention is advanced, but the
cost is not properly shared over the relevant class. This is unfair to the
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person entrapped. The defense of entrapment exists to prevent exactly such
unfairness.
Conceiving of the entrapment defense as a response to the problem of
unfairness unravels one of the core puzzles of the entrapment defense: why
it is limited to cases where a government agent, rather than a private party,
encourages the defendant. A person is neither more responsible nor more
dangerous if, unbeknownst to him, his tempter worked for the government.
Indeed, the deterrent effect of convicting a person entrapped by the
government might be greater than if the inducer were a private party.
Convicting a person governmentally entrapped demonstrates the state's
commitment to aggressively rooting out potential criminals and punishing
the culpable. Nor does government entrapment present a significant threat
to civil rights. A government intent on suppressing dissent has many more
practical means than entrapment, and the defense of entrapment is not the
only means to avoid conviction in such cases. The key to the
governmental/private inducer distinction is the agent-relative nature of the
fairness principle. Fairness bars the state from arbitrarily selecting a class
member for burdening, while the state may impose burdens based on the
arbitrary selection of a class member by others. In this respect, fairness is
like other principles of justice, such as corrective justice, which requires the
correcting of only the wrongs imposed by the agent, while allowing wrongs
imposed by others to be disregarded.
Explicating the entrapment defense in terms of unfairness suggests
directions for the entrapment doctrine to develop. However, regardless
whether these suggestions are adopted, bringing to bear considerations of
moral and political philosophy, as well as insights and analogies from other
areas of law, serves to better mark the defense's present position and to
illuminate its future path. If criminal law does not look outward, beyond its
scholastic boundaries, if it does not look deeper, beneath its case law
articulation, then criminal law is fated to become entrapped in its own
doctrinal mazes.
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